Definição do sistema de comércio mundial
Princípios do sistema comercial.
Os acordos da OMC são longos e complexos porque são textos legais que cobrem uma ampla gama de atividades. Eles lidam com: agricultura, têxteis e vestuário, bancos, telecomunicações, compras governamentais, padrões industriais e segurança de produtos, regulamentos de saneamento de alimentos, propriedade intelectual e muito mais. Mas uma série de princípios simples e fundamentais são executados em todos esses documentos. Esses princípios são a base do sistema multilateral de comércio.
Um olhar mais atento sobre esses princípios:
Mais informações introdutórias.
Comércio sem discriminação.
1. Nação mais favorecida (MFN): tratar outras pessoas de forma igual nos termos dos acordos da OMC, os países não podem normalmente discriminar entre os seus parceiros comerciais. Conceda a alguém um favor especial (como uma taxa de direito aduaneiro mais baixo para um de seus produtos) e você deve fazer o mesmo para todos os outros membros da OMC.
Este princípio é conhecido como tratamento de nação mais favorecida (NMF) (ver caixa). É tão importante que seja o primeiro artigo do Acordo Geral sobre Tarifas e Comércio (GATT), que rege o comércio de mercadorias. A NMF também é uma prioridade no Acordo Geral sobre Comércio de Serviços (AGCS) (Artigo 2) e no Acordo sobre os Aspectos dos Direitos de Propriedade Intelectual relacionados com o Comércio (TRIPS) (Artigo 4), embora em cada acordo o princípio seja tratado de forma ligeiramente diferente . Juntos, esses três acordos abrangem as três principais áreas de comércio tratadas pela OMC.
Algumas exceções são permitidas. Por exemplo, os países podem estabelecer um acordo de comércio livre que se aplica apenas a bens comercializados dentro do grupo - discriminando produtos de fora. Ou podem oferecer aos países em desenvolvimento um acesso especial aos seus mercados. Ou um país pode criar barreiras contra produtos que são considerados negociados de forma injusta em países específicos. E em serviços, os países podem, em circunstâncias limitadas, discriminar. Mas os acordos só permitem essas exceções em condições estritas. Em geral, a NMF significa que cada vez que um país abaixa uma barreira comercial ou abre um mercado, tem que fazê-lo pelos mesmos produtos ou serviços de todos os seus parceiros comerciais - seja rico ou pobre, fraco ou forte.
2. Tratamento nacional: o tratamento de estrangeiros e locais de origem. Os bens importados e produzidos localmente devem ser tratados de forma igualitária - pelo menos depois que os bens estrangeiros entraram no mercado. O mesmo deve ser aplicado a serviços estrangeiros e domésticos, e a marcas comerciais, direitos autorais e patentes estrangeiras e locais. Este princípio do "tratamento nacional" (dando aos outros o mesmo tratamento que os próprios nacionais) também é encontrado em todos os três principais acordos da OMC (artigo 3º do GATT, artigo 17 do AGCS e artigo 3º do TRIPS), embora mais uma vez o princípio é manuseado de forma ligeiramente diferente em cada um desses.
O tratamento nacional só se aplica quando um produto, serviço ou item de propriedade intelectual entrou no mercado. Por conseguinte, a cobrança de direitos aduaneiros sobre uma importação não constitui uma violação do tratamento nacional, mesmo que os produtos produzidos localmente não cobram um imposto equivalente.
Comércio mais livre: gradualmente, através da negociação.
Reduzir as barreiras comerciais é um dos meios mais óbvios de encorajar o comércio. As barreiras em questão incluem direitos aduaneiros (ou tarifas) e medidas como proibições de importação ou cotas que restringem as quantidades seletivamente. De tempos em tempos, outras questões, como a burocracia e as políticas cambiais, também foram discutidas.
Desde a criação do GATT em 1947-48, houve oito rodadas de negociações comerciais. Uma nona rodada, no âmbito da Agenda de Desenvolvimento de Doha, está em andamento. No início, estes focaram na redução de tarifas (direitos aduaneiros) em bens importados. Como resultado das negociações, em meados da década de 1990, as taxas arancelarias dos países industrializados sobre os bens industriais caíram de forma constante para menos de 4%.
Mas, na década de 1980, as negociações se expandiram para cobrir barreiras não tarifárias sobre os bens e para as novas áreas, como serviços e propriedade intelectual.
Abertura de mercados pode ser benéfica, mas também requer ajuste. Os acordos da OMC permitem que os países introduzam mudanças gradualmente, através de "liberalização progressiva". Os países em desenvolvimento geralmente são mais demorados para cumprir suas obrigações.
Previsibilidade: através da vinculação e transparência.
Às vezes, prometer não criar uma barreira comercial pode ser tão importante como uma redução, uma vez que a promessa dá às empresas uma visão mais clara das suas oportunidades futuras. Com estabilidade e previsibilidade, o investimento é incentivado, são criados empregos e os consumidores podem aproveitar plenamente os benefícios da concorrência - escolha e preços mais baixos. O sistema multilateral de comércio é uma tentativa dos governos de tornar o ambiente empresarial estável e previsível.
A Rodada Uruguai aumentou as ligações.
Percentagens de tarifas vinculadas antes e depois das conversas de 1986-94.
(Estas são linhas tarifárias, portanto as percentagens não são ponderadas de acordo com o volume ou valor comercial)
Na OMC, quando os países concordam em abrir seus mercados para bens ou serviços, eles "vinculam" seus compromissos. Para os bens, estas ligações equivalem a limites máximos das tarifas aduaneiras. Às vezes, os países importam as importações a taxas inferiores às taxas consolidadas. Freqüentemente, esse é o caso nos países em desenvolvimento. Nos países desenvolvidos, as taxas realmente cobradas e as taxas consolidadas tendem a ser as mesmas.
Um país pode mudar suas ligações, mas apenas depois de negociar com seus parceiros comerciais, o que poderia significar compensá-los pela perda de comércio. Uma das conquistas das negociações comerciais multilaterais do Uruguay Round foi aumentar o volume de negócios sob compromissos vinculativos (ver tabela). Na agricultura, 100% dos produtos agora possuem tarifas consolidadas. O resultado de tudo isso: um grau substancialmente maior de segurança do mercado para comerciantes e investidores.
O sistema também tenta melhorar a previsibilidade e a estabilidade de outras formas. Uma maneira é desencorajar o uso de cotas e outras medidas usadas para estabelecer limites sobre as quantidades de importações - a administração de cotas pode levar a mais burocracia e acusações de jogo injusto. Outro é tornar as regras comerciais dos países tão claras e públicas ("transparentes") quanto possível. Muitos acordos da OMC exigem que os governos divulguem suas políticas e práticas publicamente no país ou notificando a OMC. A vigilância regular das políticas comerciais nacionais através do Mecanismo de Revisão das Políticas Comerciais constitui um meio adicional de incentivar a transparência, tanto a nível nacional como a nível multilateral.
Promover a concorrência leal.
A OMC às vezes é descrita como uma instituição de "livre comércio", mas isso não é inteiramente exato. O sistema permite tarifas e, em circunstâncias limitadas, outras formas de proteção. Mais precisamente, é um sistema de regras dedicado à competição aberta, justa e não distorcida.
As regras em matéria de não discriminação - NMF e tratamento nacional - destinam-se a assegurar condições de comércio justas. Assim também são aqueles em dumping (exportando abaixo do custo para ganhar participação de mercado) e subsídios. As questões são complexas e as regras tentam estabelecer o que é justo ou injusto e como os governos podem responder, em particular mediante a cobrança de taxas de importação adicionais, calculadas para compensar os danos causados pelo comércio injusto.
Muitos dos outros acordos da OMC visam apoiar a concorrência leal: na agricultura, propriedade intelectual, serviços, por exemplo. O acordo sobre contratos governamentais (um acordo "plurilateral" porque é assinado por apenas alguns membros da OMC) estende as regras da concorrência às compras de milhares de entidades governamentais em muitos países. E assim por diante.
Incentivar o desenvolvimento e a reforma econômica.
O sistema da OMC contribui para o desenvolvimento. Por outro lado, os países em desenvolvimento precisam de flexibilidade no tempo que tomam para implementar os acordos do sistema. E os próprios acordos herdam as disposições anteriores do GATT que permitem assistência especial e concessões comerciais para países em desenvolvimento.
Mais de três quartos dos membros da OMC são países em desenvolvimento e países em transição para economias de mercado. Durante os sete anos e meio da Rodada do Uruguai, mais de 60 destes países implementaram programas de liberalização comercial de forma autônoma. Ao mesmo tempo, os países em desenvolvimento e as economias em transição eram muito mais ativos e influentes nas negociações da Rodada Uruguai do que em qualquer rodada anterior, e ainda mais na atual Agenda de Doha para o Desenvolvimento.
No final da Ronda do Uruguai, os países em desenvolvimento estavam preparados para assumir a maior parte das obrigações exigidas aos países desenvolvidos. Mas os acordos lhes conferiram períodos de transição para se adaptar às disposições mais desconhecidas e, talvez, difíceis da OMC - particularmente para os países mais pobres, "menos desenvolvidos". Uma decisão ministerial adotada no final da rodada diz que países melhores devem acelerar a implementação de compromissos de acesso ao mercado em bens exportados pelos países menos desenvolvidos, e busca maior assistência técnica para eles. Mais recentemente, os países desenvolvidos começaram a permitir importações duty-free e sem contingentes para quase todos os produtos dos países menos desenvolvidos. Com tudo isso, a OMC e seus membros ainda estão passando por um processo de aprendizagem. A atual Agenda de Doha para o Desenvolvimento inclui as preocupações dos países em desenvolvimento quanto às dificuldades que enfrentam na implementação dos acordos da Rodada Uruguai.
O sistema de negociação deve ser.
sem discriminação - um país não deve discriminar entre seus parceiros comerciais (dando-lhes igualmente o "Estado da Nação Mais Favorita" ou MFN); e não deve discriminar entre produtos próprios, produtos estrangeiros, serviços ou nacionais (dando-lhes "tratamento nacional"); mais livres - barreiras que chegam através da negociação; previsíveis - empresas estrangeiras, investidores e governos devem estar confiantes de que as barreiras comerciais (incluindo tarifas e barreiras não pautais) não devem ser levantadas arbitrariamente; as taxas tarifárias e os compromissos de abertura do mercado estão "vinculados" na OMC; mais competitivo - desencorajando as práticas "injustas", como os subsídios à exportação e os produtos de dumping, abaixo do custo, para ganhar participação no mercado; mais benéfico para os países menos desenvolvidos - dando-lhes mais tempo para ajustar, maior flexibilidade e privilégios especiais.
Isso parece uma contradição. Sugere um tratamento especial, mas na OMC, na verdade, significa não discriminação - tratando praticamente todos de forma igual.
Isto é o que acontece. Cada membro trata todos os outros membros igualmente como parceiros comerciais "mais favorecidos". Se um país melhora os benefícios que dá a um sócio comercial, ele deve dar o mesmo "melhor" tratamento a todos os outros membros da OMC para que todos permaneçam "mais favorecidos".
O estado da nação mais favorecida (MFN) nem sempre significou tratamento igual. Os primeiros tratados bilaterais de NMF criaram clubes exclusivos entre os parceiros comerciais "mais favorecidos" de um país. No âmbito do GATT e agora a OMC, o clube MFN não é mais exclusivo. O princípio NMF garante que cada país aprecie seus mais de 140 colegas por igual.
Sistemas de negociação: o que é um sistema de negociação?
Um sistema de negociação é simplesmente um grupo de regras específicas, ou parâmetros, que determinam pontos de entrada e saída para um determinado patrimônio. Esses pontos, conhecidos como sinais, são frequentemente marcados em um gráfico em tempo real e levam a execução imediata de um comércio.
Médias móveis (MA) Osciladores estocásticos Força relativa Bollinger Bands & reg; Muitas vezes, duas ou mais dessas formas de indicadores serão combinadas na criação de uma regra. Por exemplo, o sistema de crossover MA usa dois parâmetros de média móvel, a longo prazo e a curto prazo, para criar uma regra: "compre quando o curto prazo cruza acima do longo prazo e venda quando o contrário é verdadeiro". Em outros casos, uma regra usa apenas um indicador. Por exemplo, um sistema pode ter uma regra que proíbe qualquer compra, a menos que a força relativa esteja acima de um determinado nível. Mas é uma combinação de todos esses tipos de regras que fazem um sistema comercial.
Como o sucesso do sistema geral depende de quão bem as regras funcionam, os comerciantes do sistema gastam otimizar o tempo para gerenciar o risco, aumentar o valor obtido por comércio e alcançar estabilidade a longo prazo. Isso é feito modificando diferentes parâmetros dentro de cada regra. Por exemplo, para otimizar o sistema de crossover MA, um comerciante testaria para ver quais médias móveis (10 dias, 30 dias, etc.) funcionam melhor e, em seguida, implementá-los. Mas a otimização pode melhorar os resultados apenas por uma pequena margem - é a combinação de parâmetros utilizados que, em última instância, determinarão o sucesso de um sistema.
Isso tira toda a emoção das negociações - A emoção é muitas vezes citada como uma das maiores falhas de investidores individuais. Os investidores que são incapazes de lidar com as perdas adivinhem suas decisões e acabam perdendo dinheiro. Ao seguir rigorosamente um sistema pré-desenvolvido, os comerciantes do sistema podem renunciar à necessidade de tomar quaisquer decisões; Uma vez que o sistema é desenvolvido e estabelecido, o comércio não é empírico porque é automatizado. Ao reduzir as ineficiências humanas, os comerciantes do sistema podem aumentar os lucros.
Os sistemas de negociação são complexos - Esta é a sua maior desvantagem. Nos estágios de desenvolvimento, os sistemas de comércio exigem uma sólida compreensão da análise técnica, a capacidade de tomar decisões empíricas e um conhecimento profundo de como os parâmetros funcionam. Mas mesmo que você não esteja desenvolvendo seu próprio sistema comercial, é importante estar familiarizado com os parâmetros que compõem o que você está usando. Adquirir todas essas habilidades pode ser um desafio.
O caso para o comércio aberto.
O caso econômico para um sistema comercial aberto baseado em regras acordadas multilateralmente é bastante simples e depende principalmente do senso comum comercial. Mas também é apoiada por evidências: a experiência do comércio mundial e do crescimento econômico desde a Segunda Guerra Mundial. As tarifas dos produtos industriais caíram acentuadamente e agora são menos de 5% nos países industrializados. Durante os primeiros 25 anos após a guerra, o crescimento econômico mundial foi em média cerca de 5% ao ano, uma alta taxa que foi em parte o resultado de menores barreiras comerciais. O comércio mundial cresceu ainda mais rápido, com uma média de cerca de 8% durante o período.
Mais informações introdutórias.
Os dados mostram um vínculo estatístico definitivo entre comércio mais livre e crescimento econômico. A teoria econômica aponta motivos fortes para o link. Todos os países, incluindo os mais pobres, têm ativos - humanos, industriais, naturais e financeiros - que podem empregar para produzir bens e serviços para seus mercados domésticos ou para competir no exterior. A economia nos diz que podemos beneficiar quando esses bens e serviços são negociados. Simplificando, o princípio da "vantagem comparativa" diz que os países prosperam primeiro aproveitando seus ativos para se concentrar no que eles podem produzir melhor e depois negociando esses produtos para produtos que outros países produzem melhor.
Em outras palavras, as políticas comerciais liberais - políticas que permitem o fluxo irrestrito de bens e serviços - aumentam a concorrência, motivam a inovação e produzem sucesso. Eles multiplicam as recompensas resultantes da produção dos melhores produtos, com o melhor design, ao melhor preço.
Mas o sucesso no comércio não é estático. A capacidade de competir bem em produtos específicos pode mudar de empresa para empresa quando o mercado muda ou as novas tecnologias tornam possíveis produtos mais baratos e melhores. Os produtores são encorajados a se adaptar gradualmente e de forma relativamente indolor. Eles podem se concentrar em novos produtos, encontrar um novo "nicho" em sua área atual ou expandir para novas áreas.
A experiência mostra que a competitividade também pode mudar entre países inteiros. Um país que pode ter desfrutado de uma vantagem por causa de menores custos trabalhistas ou porque possui bons suprimentos de recursos naturais, também pode tornar-se não competitivo em alguns bens ou serviços à medida que sua economia se desenvolve. No entanto, com o estímulo de uma economia aberta, o país pode avançar para se tornar competitivo em alguns outros bens ou serviços. Este é normalmente um processo gradual.
No entanto, a tentação de afastar o desafio das importações competitivas está sempre presente. E os governos mais ricos são mais propensos a ceder à chamada de sirene do protecionismo, para ganhos políticos de curto prazo - por meio de subsídios, burocracia complicada e escondendo por trás de objetivos políticos legítimos como preservação ambiental ou proteção ao consumidor como desculpa para proteger os produtores.
A proteção, em última instância, leva a produtores inchados e ineficientes que fornecem aos consumidores produtos desatualizados e pouco atraentes. No final, as fábricas fecham e os empregos são perdidos apesar da proteção e subsídios. Se outros governos em todo o mundo perseguirem as mesmas políticas, os mercados contratados e a atividade econômica mundial são reduzidos. Um dos objetivos que os governos trazem às negociações da OMC é evitar uma deriva tão destrutiva e destrutiva no protecionismo.
VERDADEIRO E NÃO TRIVIAL?
O premiado do Nobel, Paul Samuelson, já foi desafiado pelo matemático Stanislaw Ulam para "me nomear uma proposição em todas as ciências sociais que é verdadeira e não trivial".
A resposta de Samuelson? Vantagem comparativa.
"Que é lógicamente verdadeiro não precisa ser discutido antes de um matemático; que não é trivial é atestada pelos milhares de homens importantes e inteligentes que nunca conseguiram compreender a doutrina para si mesmos ou acreditar depois de ter sido explicado a eles ".
Vantagem comparativa.
Esta é indiscutivelmente a visão mais poderosa da economia.
Suponha que o país A seja melhor do que o país B na fabricação de automóveis, e o país B é melhor que o país A ao fazer pão. É óbvio (os acadêmicos dirão "trivial") que ambos beneficiarão se A se especializasse em automóveis, B especializada em pão e eles negociassem seus produtos. Esse é um caso de vantagem absoluta.
Mas e se um país é ruim em fazer tudo? O comércio afetará todos os produtores fora do mercado? A resposta, segundo Ricardo, é não. A razão é o princípio da vantagem comparativa.
Diz que os países A e B ainda podem se beneficiar de negociar um com o outro, mesmo que A seja melhor que B ao fazer tudo. Se A é muito mais superior na fabricação de automóveis e apenas um pouco superior na fabricação de pão, então A deve ainda investir recursos no que faz melhor - produzir automóveis - e exportar o produto para B. B ainda deve investir no que faz melhor - fazendo pão - e exportar esse produto para A, mesmo que não seja tão eficiente como A. Ambos ainda se beneficiarão do comércio. Um país não precisa ser o melhor em nada para ganhar com o comércio. Isso é uma vantagem comparativa.
A teoria remonta ao economista clássico David Ricardo. É um dos mais amplamente aceitos entre os economistas. É também um dos mais mal compreendidos entre os não economistas porque está confundido com vantagem absoluta.
Costuma-se alegar, por exemplo, que alguns países não têm vantagem comparativa em nada. Isso é praticamente impossível.
O comércio mundial e a produção se aceleraram.
Tanto o comércio como o PIB caíram no final da década de 1920, antes de terminar em 1932. Após a Segunda Guerra Mundial, ambos aumentaram exponencialmente, a maior parte do tempo com o comércio superando o PIB.
Definição do sistema de comércio mundial
É uma parte bonita do mundo. O satélite nos permite calcular sua localização precisa em qualquer lugar do mundo.
O mundo estava e ficou chocado. Ele quer mostrar ao mundo que qualquer um pode aprender a ser um embaixador. sua contribuição pessoal para a história mundial.
No exterior, Bush foi visto como um estadista mundial. A China emergiu uma vez mais como uma potência mundial.
Atenas teve fortes laços com o mundo árabe. o mundo em desenvolvimento.
Seu mundo parecia tão diferente do meu. Perdi meu emprego e foi como se meu mundo estivesse entrando em colapso.
o N, com o supp, de N da n.
O mundo editorial certamente nunca viu um evento como esse.
Ele parecia algo de outro mundo.
& # 9830; frase separada dos mundos usu v-link PHR, de PHR de n (ênfase) Intelectualmente, este homem e eu somos mundos separados.
& # 9830; o melhor dos dois mundos frase PHR após v, v-link PHR.
Sua sala oferece o melhor dos dois mundos, com um escritório em uma extremidade e sofás confortáveis no outro.
& # 9830; faça um mundo de bom / faça sb / sth o mundo da boa frase V inflecte.
Um sono irá fazer você o mundo do bem.
& # 9830; na frase mundial de PHR após superl (ênfase) A coisa mais triste do mundo é um bebê pequeno que ninguém quer. Ele não tinha ninguém no mundo, exceto ela.
& # 9830; O que no mundo / quem no mundo / onde no mundo fala a frase PHR (ênfase) O que no mundo ele está fazendo.
& # 9830; em uma frase de mundo ideal / perfeita PHR com cl (= idealmente)
Em um mundo perfeito, haveria instalações e dinheiro para tratar cada pessoa doente.
& # 9830; homem do mundo / mulher do mundo frase homem / mulher inflecte.
Olhe, nós dois somos homens do mundo, alguém realmente se importaria ?,. uma mulher elegante, inteligente e resistente do mundo.
& # 9830; fora desta frase mundial v-link PHR (ênfase) Estes novos trens estão fora deste mundo.
Para muitos, o correio é o único link com o mundo exterior.
& # 9830; pense que o mundo da frase Vb infla, PHR n.
Eu acho o mundo dele, mas algo me diz que não é amor. Estávamos muito perto. Nós pensamos o mundo um do outro.
& # 8594; não seja o fim do mundo.
& # 8594; o mundo é sua ostra.
Se alguém se refere a um mundo novo e corajoso, eles estão falando sobre uma situação ou sistema recentemente criado e que as pessoas pensam que será bem sucedido e justo. n-sing usu N of n.
. o mundo bravo e novo do banco de internet.
As partes mais prósperas e industrializadas do mundo são algumas vezes referidas como o Primeiro Mundo. Compare o Terceiro Mundo. (NEGÓCIO) n-proper the N, N n.
Embora a África do Sul tenha muitos dos atributos do primeiro mundo - algumas boas infra-estruturas, milhões de pessoas ricas - ainda não é parte desse mundo. países ricos do primeiro mundo.
A Primeira Guerra Mundial ou a Primeira Guerra é a guerra que foi travada entre 1914 e 1918 na Europa. n-proper the N.
O Novo Mundo é usado para se referir aos continentes da América do Norte e do Sul. n-proper the N.
. o crescimento maciço nas importações de bons vinhos do Novo Mundo e da Australásia.
Se você fala sobre o mundo, você está se referindo ao mundo e à vida em geral, em contraste com a própria vida, experiência e idéias de uma pessoa em particular, o que pode parecer desigual e irreal. n-cante o N.
Quando eles finalmente deixam a escola, eles estarão totalmente mal equipados para lidar com o mundo real.
A Segunda Guerra Mundial é a principal guerra que foi travada entre 1939 e 1945. n-proper the N.
Os países da África, Ásia e América do Sul às vezes são referidos a todos juntos como o Terceiro Mundo, especialmente aquelas partes que são pobres, não têm muito poder e não são consideradas altamente desenvolvidas. Compare First World. n-proper the N, N n.
. desenvolvimento no Terceiro Mundo. Dívida do Terceiro Mundo.
Um jogador de esportes de classe mundial, artista ou organização é um dos melhores do mundo. (JOURNALISM) adj usu ADJ n.
Ele estava determinado a se tornar um jogador de classe mundial.
Alguém ou algo que é mundialmente famoso é conhecido por pessoas de todo o mundo. adj.
. o mundialmente famoso Hollywood Bowl.
No campo da eletrônica de consumo, a Philips está determinada a permanecer líder mundial.
A Organização Mundial do Comércio é uma organização internacional que encoraja e regula o comércio entre seus Estados membros. A abreviatura OMC também é usada. n-apropriado.
Muitos artistas expressam sua visão de mundo em seus trabalhos.
Muitos idosos foram duas guerras mundiais. No final da segunda guerra mundial, ele estava trabalhando como um docker.
Uma pessoa cansada do mundo já não se sente excitada ou entusiasmada com qualquer coisa. adj (= jaded)
A World Wide Web é um sistema informático que liga documentos e imagens a um banco de dados que está armazenado em computadores em diversas partes do mundo e que as pessoas em todos os lugares podem usar. As abreviaturas WWW e a Web são freqüentemente usadas. (COMPUTAÇÃO) n-apropriado N.
mundo do ciberespaço n. Um mundo virtual progressivo de computadores globais com redes de infraestruturas interdependentes de tecnologia da informação, redes de telecomunicações e sistemas de processamento de computadores, em que ocorre a interação online. Sistema de bancos de dados interativo o. O sistema de bancos de dados interativos é um processo de armazenamento de dados em arquivos com base na interação entre partes de dados. mundo digital n. espectro elétrico de dados criando, armazenando, recuperando e sincronizando para todo o mundo exp. Expressão intensificadora, frequentemente usada com "look" sistema on-line n. um estado de conectividade ao ciberespaço através de um meio de internet ou rede de computadores IEMS n. Sistema Médico de Emergência Integrado get smth./someone of one's system exp. se livrar de um forte sentimento em relação a algo ou a alguém de armazenamento digital n. sistema utilizado para o armazenamento de ativos digitais. FreeRice n. O único jogo de vocabulário do mundo que alimenta a fome! em associação com o Programa Mundial de Alimentos. & # 13; & # 10; Jogue, aprenda e dê arroz com todas as respostas certas!
Índice alfabético.
Bem-vindo ao dicionário inglês-Cobuild Collins. Digite a palavra que você procura na caixa de pesquisa acima. Os resultados incluirão palavras e frases do dicionário geral, bem como entradas do colaborativo.
Definição do sistema de comércio mundial
Vincent Ferraro, Ana Cristina Santos e Julie Ginocchio.
De 1686 a 1759, a lei francesa proibiu a importação de calicó impressos. Cerca de 16.000 pessoas perderam a vida como resultado desta lei, executada por violar a lei ou morto em distúrbios impulsionados pela oposição à lei. Agora é difícil imaginar a intensidade dos sentimentos gerados pelas disputas comerciais no passado: é improvável que o Congresso dos EUA impouse a pena de morte por dirigir uma Toyota. No entanto, as disputas comerciais continuam a suscitar emoções elevadas. À medida que a Guerra Fria retrocede como o principal foco das relações internacionais, os conflitos comerciais se tornarão mais freqüentes e mais intensos.
Do ponto de vista teórico, as disputas comerciais não deveriam existir. Afinal, a doutrina econômica pressupõe que as nações troquem livremente bens e serviços e que as forças impessoais da oferta e da procura determinem, presumivelmente, a alocação desses recursos. A busca de uma alocação de recursos mais eficiente, orientada pela doutrina da vantagem comparativa, é realizada por muitos como um objetivo genuinamente universal, compartilhado por todas as nações, independentemente da cultura, história, tempo ou espaço.
As nações, no entanto, como indivíduos, são motivadas por valores às vezes bastante diferentes e até inconsistentes com a eficiência econômica. Se as nações não negociassem entre si, cada nação poderia perseguir seus diferentes objetivos de forma consistente com a importância relativa de cada um. O comércio complica este processo de classificação: obriga as nações a negociar entre a eficiência e outros valores possíveis, como a equidade econômica, a estabilidade social, a proteção ambiental ou a representação política. A intrusão do comércio explica o seu significado político.
No início do período moderno, a maioria das nações na Europa simplesmente controlava o comércio para que sua intrusão pudesse ser gerenciada de forma rígida. O termo mercantilismo é geralmente usado para descrever esse sistema de controle. De um modo geral, as políticas mercantilistas foram destinadas a estimular as exportações e a deprimir as importações para que o país sempre tenha uma balança comercial favorável, políticas que foram possíveis em grande parte devido ao forte envolvimento do Estado na atividade econômica através de empresas comerciais e similares. O balanço comercial favorável representou uma acumulação de riqueza, que poderia servir como um recurso para as aspirações políticas e militares do estado. Naquele momento, não havia distinção significativa entre objetivos políticos e econômicos, ou, como Jacob Viner descreveu, entre poder e abundância.
As políticas utilizadas para apoiar os objetivos mercantilistas eram bastante diretas: a importação de certos produtos seria proibida por lei; a produção de certos produtos em colônias governadas por estados mercantilistas seria banida; Seriam concedidos subsídios aos produtores de exportações favorecidas; e o estado tomaria as medidas necessárias para assegurar uma marinha viável para o transporte de exportações. Além dessas políticas gerais, cada estado tinha medidas específicas que refletiam suas circunstâncias únicas, mas todas as políticas mercantilistas desse período refletem os fortes interesses políticos e econômicos do estado. Como argumentado por Edward Meade Earle em 1943:
Em suma, os fins do mercantilismo eram a unificação do estado nacional e o desenvolvimento de seus recursos industriais, comerciais, financeiros, militares e navais. Para alcançar esses fins, o Estado interveio nos assuntos econômicos, para que as atividades de seus cidadãos ou assuntos possam ser efetivamente desviados para canais, o que aumentaria o poder político e militar.
À medida que o capitalismo amadureceu e os direitos econômicos e políticos começaram a aderir aos indivíduos, a intervenção direta do Estado na administração da atividade econômica tornou-se menos necessária e menos desejável. Em The Wealth of Nations (1776), Adam Smith articulou um sistema econômico impulsionado pelos interesses privados dos indivíduos e não dos públicos do estado. Mais importante ainda, no entanto, Smith argumentou que uma "mão oculta" transformaria esses interesses privados e egoístas em benefício público - maior atividade econômica e um excedente econômico no qual o Estado poderia aproveitar, através da tributação, seus requisitos de segurança. Em outras palavras, o mercado livre poderia canalizar de forma mais eficiente a atividade econômica do que o estado de maneira que realmente aumentasse o poder do estado: a busca privada da abundância também poderia resultar na aquisição pública de poder.
A luta para realizar este quadro no país foi difícil e ainda não foi totalmente resolvida, exceto em alguns dos países industrializados avançados. Internacionalmente, a luta para criar um mercado livre foi significativamente mais difícil. Em 1817, o economista britânico David Ricardo escreveu The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, que ampliou o argumento de Smith ao comércio exterior e defendeu o livre comércio com base na vantagem comparativa. Ricardo tentou provar que se dois países se envolvessem em comércio, cada um deveria se especializar em produtos que ele produz relativamente bem: mesmo que um dos países seja melhor em produzir todos os produtos, ele ainda pode se beneficiar do comércio, enfatizando os produtos que ele produz melhor e importando esses produtos o que é relativamente ineficiente na produção. Desde o tempo de Ricardo, a doutrina econômica dominante aceitou essa proposição e argumentou que o comércio irrestrito resulta em uma produção amplamente expandida e, portanto, maior riqueza.
A luta para implementar e impor práticas mundiais de comércio livre foi liderada primeiro pela Grã-Bretanha e posteriormente pelos Estados Unidos. In truth, neither state fully subscribed to the principles of free trade, but the rhetorical support provided by each to the principles was almost religious, as well-described by Lord Maynard Keynes:
I was brought, like most Englishmen, to respect free trade not only as an economic doctrine, which a rational and instructed person could not doubt, but also almost as a part of the moral law. I regarded ordinary departures from it as being at the same time an imbecility and an outrage. I thought England's unshakable free trade convictions, maintained for nearly a hundred years, to be both the explanation before man and the justification before Heaven of her economic supremacy.
The British maintained a very elaborate and sophisticated set of trade preferences within the Empire but often abandoned its free trade practices outside the Empire whenever such exceptions seemed appropriate.
The Post World War II Trade Regime.
Nonetheless, the doctrine of free trade is an unquestionably powerful idea and since the end of World War II it has been championed by the United States and has served as the measure of determining governmental policy for many states in the international system. In the late 20th century, a very strong movement toward freeing trade further has occurred: the policies of some of the more protectionist states in the system-Brazil, China, India, Russia, and France-have moved toward strong liberalization. One should not interpret this movement as irreversible since attitudes toward trade historically can change very rapidly. But at this particular point in time, there is little question that free trade is being aggressively pursued by most of the major economic powers.
The idea of free trade is seductively simple: barriers to the free flow of goods and services, such as tariffs and quotas, should be reduced to zero. Individual entrepreneurs would invest their capital in those areas in which they would make the most profit. Global production would then increase dramatically as greater efficiencies of production are realized, and, as a result, the wealth of the world would increase.
There is no question that increased trade among nations shows a clear correlation with increased wealth on a global scale. In 1820 world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was estimated to be around $695 billion (US 1990$); by 1992 world GDP had increased to $27,995 billion (US 1990$). World exports were about $7 billion (US 1990$) in 1820 and by 1992 they had increased to about $3,786 billion (US 1990$). Stated another way, exports accounted for only about 1 percent of world product in 1820. By 1913 exports accounted for about 8.7 percent, and by 1992 the figure was about 13.5 percent. Increased trade is certainly partially responsible for the dramatic increase in wealth in the last two centuries.
Trade is also heavily concentrated. The top ten exporters accounted for over sixty percent of global exports; the top ten importers accounted for almost 58 percent of world imports (See Table 1). Indeed, the top fifty exporters accounted for 96.1 percent of all world exports, which means that around 135 countries only account for 3.9 percent of world exports. This concentration of trade reflects the concentration of global economic activity and does not suggest that trade cannot be of crucial importance to small countries.
One can also support free trade because its alternative, protectionism, is viewed as a dangerous policy. The commitment of the United States to free trade can be partially explained by the disastrous experience of the United States during the Great Depression. The decision of the United States to erect significant tariff barriers against foreign products as a way of stimulating internal demand was entirely counterproductive and led instead to a deepening of the Depression. While the decision to raise tariffs, most dramatically in the case of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, was consistent with most of American economic history, the leaders of the United States decided that its post-World War II economic policies would be quite different, and they adopted a strong free trade position as the hallmark of American power. Thus, the United States helped create and maintain the Bretton Woods System whose institutions-the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)-were committed to free trade.
Top Ten Global Exporters and Importers of Merchandise.
1995 (billions of US$)
Exporter Value Share of World Exports Importer Value Share of World Imports.
United States 583.9 11.6 United States 771.3 14.9.
Germany 508.5 10.1 Germany 443.2 8.6.
Japan 443.1 8.8 Japan 336.0 6.5.
France 286.2 5.7 France 274.5 5.3.
United Kingdom 242.1 4.8 United Kingdom 265.3 5.1.
Italy 231.2 4.6 Italy 204.0 3.9.
Netherlands 195.3 3.9 Hong Kong* 196.1 3.8.
Canada 192.2 3.8 Netherlands 175.9 3.4.
Hong Kong* 173.9 3.5 Canada 168.4 3.3.
Bel-Luxembourg 168.3 3.3 Bel-Luxembourg 154.2 3.0.
Source: World Trade Organization, Focus, No. 14 (December 1996), wto/wto/Whats_new/focus14.pdf, p. 5.
*Hong Kong had domestic exports of $29.9 billion and re-exported $143.9 billion. Its retained imports in 1995 totaled $52.1 billion.
Although not the most powerful of these institutions, the GATT is the organization most centrally concerned with establishing the global free trade regime. In 1945 the United States invited twenty-two other nations to join it in drafting an agreement that would multilaterally reduce tariffs and other barriers to trade. The negotiations held in Geneva in 1947 resulted in the GATT, which at that time was only provisional. The plan was to incorporate eventually the GATT into the proposed International Trade Organization (ITO). The ITO never came into being because of opposition, primarily from the United States, to its powers of regulating trade. The GATT took over some of the duties of the stillborn ITO, such as settling disputes and providing information about tariffs and quotas.
Over the years more countries joined the GATT, and the Contracting Parties felt the need to meet in what came to be known as trade negotiating rounds. Eight such rounds have taken place, the last three being the longest and most important: the Kennedy, Tokyo, and Uruguay Rounds.
The Kennedy Round was initiated in 1962 and concluded in 1967. Its major contribution was the introduction of multilateral trade negotiations. Previously the common practice had been to settle tariffs item by item. The new procedure introduced by the Kennedy Round treated every tariff as roughly comparable: if an item was not listed as an exception by a country, its tariff would be set at the general rate agreed upon by the country. Additionally, four main issues were discussed at the Kennedy Round: industrial tariffs, agriculture, non-tariff barriers, and the integration of developing countries into the global economy through trade. Progress on reducing industrial tariffs was quite successful: the value of trade covered was about $40 billion and the talks affected about 40 percent of the goods imported by industrialized countries. Progress was more limited in the remaining three issue areas: agricultural restrictions proved intractable due to the political significance of farming in many countries; non-tariff barriers, such as quality standards and labeling regulations, were difficult to identify and assess; and the problems of overcoming poverty in developing countries by facilitating their trade through preferences involved concessions the industrialized countries were unwilling to make.
Despite the successes in reducing industrial tariffs, the Kennedy Round failed to meet the expectations of many of the participants. One of its biggest drawbacks was that the negotiators continued to rely upon the reciprocity clause: a country would reduce its tariffs only if its trading partners did likewise. Countries were unwilling to import more unless its exports increased by a similar amount. Developing countries were also not treated as full participants in the negotiations: the United States, the European Economic Community, and Japan dominated the discussions.
The Tokyo Round opened in 1972, triggered by the withdrawal of the United States from the gold standard in 1971. Ninety-nine countries, members and non-members of GATT, participated in the extensive negotiations that would only be concluded seven years later. The Round resulted in the reduction of hundreds of tariffs and steps toward the quantification and elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade. Six major Codes of Conduct were articulated, including the Standards Code, which attempted to regulate non-tariff barriers. As was the case with the Kennedy Round, actual adherence to these new standards has been quite spotty, and, again, developing countries were not offered structural concessions.
The world had recognized that poorer countries need different treatment in the area of trade. There are two major trading institutions which try to compensate for the difficulties faced by poorer countries: the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and the tariff preferences extended to 70 African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries through the European Union's Lome IV Convention. These two systems grant lower tariffs, and, in some cases, duty free status to developing countries. The system of preferences certainly made it easier for poor countries to export their traditional products, but it also made it difficult for them to diversify their exports, particularly toward manufactured and semi-manufactured products. As the world moves closer toward a lowering of all MFN tariffs, however, the advantages offered by these two systems will inherently decline.
The Uruguay Round was the most important and most comprehensive of all rounds. Initiated on September 20, 1986 in Punta del Este, it was stalled for three years due to conflicts between the United States and the European Union over agricultural trade. The credibility of multilateral negotiations was at stake during those years; if the disputes had not been settled, the global framework of international trade might have succumbed to protectionism and bilateral agreements. A compromise was reached in December 1993 in Geneva, and the final text was signed the following March in Marrakech.
The Uruguay Round was a watershed in the history of the GATT. The jurisdiction of the agreement was extended to issues which many countries had reserved to their national sovereignty: services, textiles, and agriculture. The establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) was its greatest accomplishment. The WTO has the power to actually resolve disputes, putting an end to further multilateral rounds of negotiations. Unlike GATT decisions, those made by the WTO are binding. More complex and far-reaching then the GATT, the WTO is the successor to GATT (and the reincarnation of the ITO).
Established in Geneva on January 1, 1995, the WTO already has over 120 members. Its additional functions include implementing all multilateral trade agreements and overseeing national trade policies. In December 1996, the WTO held its first biennial Ministerial Conference in Singapore, and concluded the Information Technology Act which dealt with matters concerning protection of intellectual property rights associated with new electronic technologies. The Ministerial Conference is the WTO's highest authority, and is composed of the trade ministers from every single member. Several bodies and committees work around a General Council in the Geneva headquarters of the WTO. So far, only minor issues have been turned over to the WTO for resolution (such as bananas and Costa Rican underwear). At this stage it is impossible to assess the effectiveness of the WTO: the question of whether it will be able to enforce its decisions in those cases remains an open question.
Exceptions to a Global Free Trade Regime: Regional Trading Blocs.
The WTO will be operating in a global environment, which is, in some respects, more favorable to the idea of freer trade, but organized along regional lines. Article XXIV of the GATT allows for regional institutions to establish their own free trade areas as potential way stations to a global regime:
The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies of the countries parties to such agreements.
There are many such agreements in the world, but these agreements are far from uniform in scope. There are different levels of integration in the world, and each regional organization deals with the issue of national sovereignty differently. A free trade area (FTA) is the simplest form of trade alliance: barriers to trade only among member states are lowered, and each country remains independent with respect to non-members of the FTA. Custom Unions go one step further: they establish a common external tariff (CET) which applied uniformly to non-members. At the most sophisticated level of regional integration, nations form a common market in which there is, in addition to free mobility of the factors of production (capital and labor), a common trade policy and the harmonizing of national economic legislation.
The process of regional integration has grown steadily since the end of World War II. In the early 1950s many believed that the tensions between France and Germany could only be reduced if the two were tied together economically. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was created, and it served as a stepping-stone to the Treaty of Rome (1957) which gave birth to the European Economic Community (EEC). The EEC has evolved over the years and is still involved in arduous negotiations to achieve a higher level of political and economic integration, including the creation of a common currency. From an initial group of six, it now consists of fifteen countries, and other nations have applied for membership.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Mercosur are more recent regional trade alliances. NAFTA was signed by the United States, Canada, and Mexico in 1992, and entered into force on January 1, 1994. The Treaty of Asunción, which created Mercosur, was signed by Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay in March 1991, and was implemented on January 1, 1995. As of now, both agreements are free trade areas, which aim to withdraw all barriers to the exchange of goods, services, and capital only among the member nations. Mercosur, however, plans to eventually become a common market and follow the European example; it is now, however, only a semi-functioning customs union.
Both NAFTA and Mercosur are currently reviewing membership applications from other Latin American nations, and, at the Summit of the Americas in 1994, thirty-four countries supported the creation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The path toward such integration will not be an easy one, especially because the area involved is much more heterogeneous than Europe. Some initial efforts have been made, but it remains to be seen if the United States in particular is willing to pursue and support some form of hemispheric integration.
Overall, regional trading blocs account for about 61 percent of all trade, a very high percentage. C. Fred Bergsten estimates the different shares for the main blocs in the world today:
Regional Free Trade Arrangements.
(share of world trade, 1994)
European Union 22.8.
Free Trade Area of the Americas 2.6.
Australia-New Zealand 0.1.
Source: C. Fred Bergsten, "Competitive Liberalization and Global Free Trade: A Vision for the Early 21st Century, Institute for International Economics, APEC Working Paper 96-15, 1996, iie:80/9615.htm.
Quite clearly, the regional trading blocs are highly significant actors in world trade. Their danger is that, although they are expected to be mere way stations to a global free trade regime, they also represent institutional interests that may actually restrict trade.
Exceptions to a Global Free Trade Regime: Economic Protection.
By far the most important exceptions to free trade come from pressures to protect a domestic economy from international competition. The techniques for such protection include tariffs, quotas, export subsidies, government procurement policies, quality, safety, and health regulations, and a whole host of other pricing mechanisms. In 1993, the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimated that protectionist measures cost the global economy about $450 billion a year. At the global level, the arguments supporting free trade are probably unassailable: free trade unquestionably stimulates more efficient production and, as we have seen, greater wealth.
Nations, however, are not asked to defend a global perspective; they are expected to defend national interests. While free trade may actually create jobs by stimulating demand and lowering prices, free trade cannot guarantee that those who lose their jobs because of their higher wages will be hired to fill the new jobs created by the economic stimulus. It is this asymmetry of benefits, distributed unequally among different countries, and among different products and different workers, which creates powerful opposition to free trade.
Quantifying the effects of freer trade is extraordinarily difficult, as demonstrated by the problems in determining the effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on the U. S. and Mexican economies. A recent study conducted by the University of California at Los Angeles suggests that the overall effects of NAFTA since it was signed in 1994 have been quite modest:
Using a new model of how exports and imports influence jobs in various product categories and regions, the study estimated that the net job gain to the United States since the agreement took effect at the beginning of 1994 has been just 2,990 jobs. The net figure, however, masked a much greater level of both job losses and gains among different companies. Increased imports to the United States killed an estimated 28,168 jobs the last three years, the study said, while increased exports supported creation of 31,158 jobs.
Obviously the people who lost their jobs or their businesses feel that NAFTA was a bad decision. The people who gained jobs or who benefited from lower prices for the products they purchased feel that NAFTA was a good decision. The difficulty for a policy maker is determining what the overall effect on the national economy is by freer trade, including the costs of addressing the needs of those who lose their jobs or businesses.
Those who support greater protection against economic competition from abroad argue that domestic producers will move to countries where cheaper labor is available, or where regulations, such as environmental or safety controls, are minimal. Indeed, the logic of free trade is that producers ought to move to places in which higher profits can be made so, to the extent that such considerations are important, one would expect changes of this nature. It is difficult to determine, however, the extent to which such considerations are decisive. For example, there has not been a documented massive shift of manufacturing from the United States to Mexico or to any other country in which labor costs are substantially lower than in the United States. The manufacturing share of the U. S. economy has not drastically changed in the past thirty years (21% of the U. S. economy). It is clear that lower labor costs or reduced regulations are not the sole determinants of business decisions to relocate: in some cases they may be, but it other cases, access to skilled labor or the presence of a sophisticated infrastructure may be more important.
What is clear is that appeals to protection from free trade constitute a powerful political issue. There is no question that some jobs have been lost because of NAFTA and many believe that the U. S. Government has a responsibility to protect Americans from job erosion. Presidential hopeful Pat Buchanan made this issue a central part of his campaign in 1996:
To "conservatives of the heart," even if NAFTA brings an uptick in GNP it is no good for America. No matter the cash benefits, we don't want to merge our economy with Mexico. We don't want to force American workers to compete with dollar-an-hour Mexican labor. That's not what America is all about.
In many countries there are provisions for helping workers whose jobs are lost due to trade, but it is hard to assert that those programs are especially successful. By and large, trade-displaced workers are older, less educated, and less mobile than workers who are attractive to the more dynamic sectors of an economy.
Additionally, one should always be aware that justifications for trade protection are also defenses of relative inefficiency. Tariffs and quotas are costs to an economy, ones usually borne by the consumer. They can protect workers, but, in the process, they can also protect the private corporate interests of those who hire the workers. In the early 1980s the automobile industry in the United States was at a competitive disadvantage to Japanese producers and lobbied for protection against imported automobiles. After a quota was implemented, the prices of automobiles when up rather dramatically. The American industry announced that the quota saved about 22,000 jobs. The quota also increased the profits of the industry. However, the price increase led to a sales drop of about one million cars which in turn led to a loss of about 50,000 jobs in the industry.
Exceptions to a Global Free Trade Regime: National Security Concerns.
The ideal of global free trade faces a challenge when viewed in light of national security concerns. Nations do not wish to export products to their adversaries which might have the effect of enhancing their relative power, even if the private interests producing those products have an interest in increasing their sales. During the Cold War, the economic benefits of free trade were overridden in many cases by national and multilateral export controls on strategically sensitive products. The formal agency responsible for maintaining these controls was the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) aimed to protect the West's security interests by placing restrictions on nuclear, conventional, and dual-use technologies that might have strengthened the Soviet's military position in the Cold War. COCOM, established in 1949, included Japan and all of the NATO countries except Iceland.
COCOM restrictions on strategic trade were partially effective in limiting the transfer of strategic materials to the Soviet bloc, but were never wholly successful. It proved to be extremely difficult to identify which products were of strategic value. For example, in 1972 the United States gave the Bryant Grinder Corporation authorization for a shipment of precision miniature ball-bearing grinders to the Soviet Union, which later proved to be used in Soviet guided ballistic missiles. Other COCOM states had also shipped similar types of equipment to the Soviet Union. Similarly, computer technology proved to be extraordinarily difficult to define in strategic terms: many items could be used for military purposes, and it was impossible to define those items, which could not somehow be adapted for strategic purposes.
The end of the Cold War has lessened the possibilities for effective controls over strategic exports, and COCOM was dissolved on March 31, 1994. The need to control such material however, still persists, particularly over those materials and technologies used in nuclear weapons production and delivery. Currently, the effort to restrict such exports is guided by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) which was formed in 1987. There are about 25 nations which have announced adherence to these controls which are described by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in these terms:
The MTCR is neither a treaty nor an international agreement but is a voluntary arrangement among countries which share a common interest in arresting missile proliferation. The Regime consists of common export guidelines applied to a common list of controlled items. Each member implements its commitments in the context of its own national export laws.
Such controls have never been regarded as inconsistent with a free trade regime, but if the definition of strategic were to expand significantly to include many computer and information technologies, the effects on international trade may be considerable.
Exceptions to a Global Free Trade Regime: Human Rights.
Trade is often used as a mechanism for influencing the policies of states. The United States signaled its displeasure at the Japanese invasion of Manchuria by cutting off certain vital exports to Japan. The loss of its supplies of oil and iron ore simply reinforced the position of those in Japan who argued that further armed expansion was the only solution to the vulnerability of a relatively resource-less island. On the other hand, the trade embargo against South Africa, while far from complete, ultimately succeeded in persuading the Nationalist Government that continued isolation from the rest of the world was more costly to South Africa than the establishment of majority rule. In both cases, trade was manipulated as a diplomatic instrument to achieve a certain objective.
Many simply disagree with the use of trade as a policy tool. For them, economics should follow its own logic and its purposes should not be subordinated to the political interests of the state. This position suggests that, over time, the forces of economics will slowly persuade states to cooperate more effectively, no matter what the ideological or political differences among them. Moreover, many argue that using trade as a lever for inducing change is simply ineffective. The failure of the United States embargo against Cuba to force a change in the Cuban government is a case in point.
There is probably no way to separate trade from politics, and it would be naïve to suggest otherwise. Trade restrictions are often reflections of domestic politics within states much more than they are actually well considered mechanisms of change. Perhaps the most visible case of trade politics in recent years has been the dispute between the United States and the People's Republic of China over a U. S. extension of Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) status to the Chinese.
Most-Favored-Nation status simply means that the restrictions on trade between two nations will be no more onerous than the least restrictions offered to any other single state with whom trade occurs. The status does not confer any special advantage: it merely prohibits a specific disadvantage which could possibly be directed against a single state. MFN is a crucially important status because it allows states to compete more or less equally within the global trading network.
As China has become one of the most significant factors in United States trade, importing in 1995 about $12 billion from the United States and exporting about $45 billion to the united States, the question of whether China should be granted MFN status has become critically important. There are some who oppose MFN status to China simply because they believe that the United States cannot compete with Chinese products, and an influx of Chinese goods would cost Americans jobs, arguments similar to those developed earlier in the section on protectionism. There are others, however, who argue that the absence of political freedoms in China renders China an unfit trading partner. They suggest that the United States should threaten to restrict Chinese exports to the United States unless China adopts a system of human rights more compatible with Western values.
There is very little question that the Chinese have a profoundly different system of politics than does the United States. Moreover, there is very little question that many Americans find Chinese practices, particularly the treatment of political dissidents, to be abhorrent. It is difficult, however, to accept the proposition that American political practices should be the standard by which all nations should be judged. Indeed, the United States itself might be found lacking in adherence to its own principles in many respects. The Chinese argue that its internal political system accurately reflects the values of its society, and that its internal politics are not subject to evaluation or judgment by outsiders. In some respects, the world has already answered this objection. The precedents established by the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials after World War II effectively dismissed the possibility of politics ever being a purely "domestic" matter-the position was only reinforced by subsequent actions against South Africa.
Which side is right? Initially, the United States took the position in 1993 that MFN status would not be conferred unless human rights practices in China changed dramatically. Subsequently, however, the United States changed its position, and, in 1996, granted China MFN status for a year. Presumably, that status will be renewed unless Chinese actions change dramatically for the worse.
In some sense, the Chinese had clearly won a victory over United States policy-trade would flow freely between the two nations, and no conditions were imposed on Chinese behavior. Nonetheless, this interpretation of the outcome is overly simple. United States pressure certainly discomfited the Chinese, and the publicity surrounding certain dissidents in China and the possibilities of prison labor for profit damaged China's reputation globally.
The more important point, however, was much simpler: the United States decided that its ability to influence Chinese domestic political practice through trade was minimal. This pragmatic observation led to the decision that opening trade further might lead to political changes within China more rapidly than a coercive approach, which tried to punish China for its human rights practices. As is the case with most pragmatic decisions, time will tell.
Exceptions to a Global Free Trade Regime: Environmental Protection.
The most recent exceptions to the free trade system revolve around the growing concern over how environmental regulations may be subverted by corporations moving their operations to states with lax environmental controls. There is scant systematic evidence to document how extensive this problem may be, but there are a number of examples which suggest that the problem may be widespread. Arlene Wilson of the Congressional Research Service observed that "a number of studies have shown that trade liberalization may reduce a country's overall welfare if environmental resources are incorrectly priced." It is difficult, however, to know how to price correctly environmental protection, particularly since, in the international arena, attitudes toward balancing the values of economic development and environmental protection may differ profoundly.
In making environmental standards a part of NAFTA, the United States, Canada, and Mexico have set the stage for increased debate between environmental activist organizations and advocates for freer trade. The NAFTA set up a side agreement known as the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC). This agreement provides a mechanism in which disputes over environmental regulations may be settled outside of the NAFTA framework.
Environmentalists feared that American businesses would flock to Mexico to produce more cheaply by avoiding costly U. S. environmental regulations. There is not yet sufficient information to assess whether this fear was or is justified. There seems to be wide consensus that "dirty" industries "have expanded faster in developing countries than the average rate for all industries over the last two decades - and faster than in industrial countries. It is uncertain, however, whether this international pattern merely reflects growth - or industrial migration as well." The creation of the side agreement was clearly an initiative sparked by domestic concerns within the United States, and the rhetorical level of support for environmental protection was quite high. Former Secretary of State Warren Christopher affirmed that the United States is "striving through the new World Trade Organization to reconcile the complex tensions between promoting trade and protecting the environment-and to ensure that neither comes at the expense of the other." Whether this balance can be attained remains to be seen. It is unlikely that freer trade would substantially increase the opportunities for new environmental degradation; it might, however, certainly intensify current problems.
The Critique of the Free Trade Regime.
The exceptions to the practice of free trade listed above are generally regarded as practical concessions to the political realities of the international system; they are, in some respects, modifications or reforms designed to accommodate interests which find the demands of the free market inconsistent with other values such as equality and justice. There are many, however, who believe that free trade cannot be reconciled with these other values. These critics argue that the free trade regime is in fact a political system-an imperialist system-engineered to maintain the power of the advanced industrialized countries at the expense of the poorer countries.
There are a number of variations to this argument and it is simply impossible to develop them in any detail in this essay. Marxists, dependency theorist, and liberal reformers all share some basic elements of the critique. What separates their analyses is the extent to which the system can be changed, what the nature of those changes have to be, and whether the changes have to involve the fundamental premises of the capitalist system.
The analysis of the problem is straightforward: free trade favors the more developed economies and this bias channels wealth from the poor to the rich. This process has been going on for centuries and the cumulative effect of the bias is the growing income gap between rich and poor. Powerful states, therefore, adopt free trade because it increases their power. Bismarck once noted that:
England had the highest protective duties until she had been so strengthened under the protection that she came forward as a herculean fighter and challenged everybody with, 'Enter the lists with me.' She is the strongest pugilist in the arena of competition, and is ever ready to assert the right of the strongest in trade.
From this perspective, free trade is nothing more than a mercantilist policy designed to enhance the power of a state relative to others.
The critics of free trade argue that the openness of the free trade regime exposes poorer countries to competition, which is patently unfair. Rich countries have access to capital, technology, transportation, and markets, which are generally unavailable to poorer countries. The poor countries can sell their labor and their land in the form of primary commodities. Both of these factors of production are in great supply and therefore the demand for them is low. Free trade, therefore, creates a context in which poor countries have few avenues of escape: their products are less valuable than the products of the rich countries and their relative poverty only increases the more they participate in the free trade regime.
The critics of the free trade regime stand solidly on their description of the international distribution of wealth. Since the mid-1800s, wealth and income have become increasingly concentrated in the industrialized nations. There is little question that poor countries have had a more difficult time catching up to the rich countries as free trade practices have become more global. The liberalizing of trade after the Tokyo Round did not significantly improve the status of poorer countries:
Since the end of the Tokyo Round in 1979, the average level of industrial tariffs in developed countries has fallen by nearly a half to 6.4 per cent and the value of total world merchandise trade has grown by a remarkable 4.8 per cent per year. This growth is mainly confined to the industrialized countries: in the 1980s, developing countries' exports grew by only l.6 per cent, and their share of world trade fell from 28 to 21 per cent.
There is no question that some developing countries have benefited from the expansion of trade opportunities in the post-World War H period. Many countries in East Asia -- Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Taiwan, and South Korea -- deliberately pursued an export-led strategy that resulted in impressive growth in their Gross Domestic Products. However, other countries have not been able to use trade as an "engine of growth." These countries, many of them in Africa, export primary commodities for which demand has been declining over time. The expansion of free trade into the agricultural sectors of these economies poses serious threats to the fanning communities in many of these areas. While it is probably safe to say that free trade will always benefit the wealthy, one must be more cautious in implementing free trade commitments for the poor. For them, trade will never be enough.
Challenges to the Future of the World Trading System.
There are three primary concerns that have emerged out of the recent expansion of the free trade regime. The first is over the ways by which the trade system is connected to the larger economic process of globalization. The World Trade Organization, in its Annual Report for 1995, notes the significance of the connection:
In virtually every year of the postwar period, the growth of world merchandise trade has exceeded the growth of world merchandise output. Overall, the volume of world merchandise trade is estimated to have increased at an average annual rate of slightly more than 6 per cent during the period 1950-94, compared with close to 4 per cent for world output. This means each 10 per cent increase in world output has on average been associated with a 16 per cent increase in world trade. During those 45 years, world merchandise output has multiplied 5½ times and world trade has multiplied 14 times, both in real terms.
Nations trade because there are differences in production possibilities and costs among nations. While some of these factors are fixed, others, like the cost of labor, are not. When production changes location because of these differences in costs, the demand for these factors of production changes as well. For example, the demand for high-wage labor may be reduced because of the availability of low-wage labor, which then leads to a reduction in the high wages. We know that this transformation has in fact occurred, since trade is increasing at a faster rate than production.
The fear that freer trade will depress high wages and lead to a mass exodus of jobs from the industrialized countries to the lower wage poorer countries is genuine, and manifests itself in a vision of a global network of sweatshops. As suggested above, there is little systematic or global evidence to document the extent to which this fear is legitimate. But the most important issue facing the WTO is the internationalization of standards-labor and environmental-implicit in the process of opening trade even further.
The issue is extremely complicated. Evening out the differences vitiates the efficiencies gained by comparative advantage; ignoring the differences assures strong political opposition to opening up markets. Further, there is no way to measure accurately the quality of life standards raised by questions concerning wages and environmental protection-what is a decent, living wage? What is a "clean" environment? How does one account for the cultural variations in the definitions of these criteria? Finally, the internationalization of these standards poses a serious challenge to the idea of state sovereignty. When an international organization such as the WTO or the International Labour Organization (ILO) begins to dictate working conditions within a country, serious questions arise about the ability of states to manage their own domestic affairs.
The second major challenge facing the world trading system concerns its ability to enforce its rules. The conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the creation of the WTO reflect the economic and political power of "new" entrants to the global economy: most importantly China and the states of the former Soviet Union. Additional impetus for the new structures came from states that changed their trade policies toward more liberalized trade: India and Brazil. The more traditional supporters of free trade, the United States and several of the European states, actually saw domestic support for free trade decline.
That free trade expanded under recent conditions is not especially surprising in light of historical experience: in good economic times, free trade typically expands. The real strength of the new trade regime will be tested when an economic downturn occurs. Under conditions of economic stress, domestic pressures for protectionist measures increase dramatically. The WTO has a Dispute Settlement Body and an Appellate Body to enforce the rulings of the WTO, but the general effect of these enforcement mechanisms thus far has been to persuade nations to resolve their disputes "out of court." Such resolutions of trade disputes are important and should not be discounted; nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether the WTO has the ability to enforce unpopular decisions on powerful states.
The third and final challenge to the world trading system is the presence, persistence, and expansion of global poverty. It is a mistake to think that the WTO can address this problem on its own. It is also a mistake, however, to think that an uncritical pursuit of free trade will help all countries equally. One of the clear characteristics of trade is that it rather faithfully represents the distribution of economic power in the international system. That some poor countries have been able to use trade to stimulate their economies to grow at rather rapid rates is an important reason to support free trade in principle. But it cannot be used as a blanket justification for policies that expose very poor societies to economic competition that undermines their viability.
The current distribution of wealth is not defensible, either in moral or in practical terms. There are far too many people on the planet who lead lives of total desperation: over a billion people are malnourished, ill housed, and cut off from adequate education, medical care, clean water, and a safe environment. Free trade will not, on its own, pull these people into prosperity. Moreover, in a free trade regime, the economic fortunes of the rich countries are inextricably linked to the fortunes of the poor. Free trade has a convergence effect, although the power of that effect is not clearly measurable. if industries do migrate to low wage areas, then the tendency will be for high wages to fall. At some point, the reduction in wages will have a depressing effect on demand for products and this reduction will unquestionably lead to lower rates of economic growth, perhaps even negative growth rates.
This challenge to the free trade regime is not dramatic or immediate, but it is inexorable. Nor does it suggest that free trade itself should be abandoned as a general principle. But the challenge of global poverty demands that richer countries think about trade as a way of helping poor nations integrate more successfully into the global economy. Such integration will require concessions to protect the weak economic infrastructures of many countries from the rather unforgiving rigors of free trade.
The foundations of the world trading system.
If you wish to get more information about World Trade Organization, just click WTO. Its URL is: wto. As WTO updates its site periodically, some of these documents are not readily accessible. To assist students, however, some items are copied below. These documents originated in the WTO websites, and Kwan Choi is NOT the author.
What is the World Trade Organization?
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the legal and institutional foundation of the multilateral trading system. It provides the principal contractual obligations determining how governments frame and implement domestic trade legislation and regulations. And it is the platform on which trade relations among countries evolve through collective debate, negotiation and adjudication.
The WTO was established on 1 January 1995. Governments had concluded the Uruguay Round negotiations on December 15, 1993 and Ministers had given their political backing to the results by signing the Final Act at a meeting in Marrakesh, Morocco in April 1994. The 'Marrakesh Declaration' of 15 April 1994, affirmed that the results of the Uruguay Round would "strengthen the world economy and lead to more trade, investment, employment and income growth throughout the world". The WTO is the embodiment of the Uruguay Round results and the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
Out of a potential membership of 152 countries and territories, 76 governments became members of the WTO on its first day, with some 50 other governments at various stages of completing their domestic ratification procedures, and the remainder engaged in negotiating their terms of entry.
Not only does the WTO have a potentially larger membership than GATT (128 by the end of 1994), it also has a much broader scope in terms of the commercial activity and trade policies to which it applies. The GATT applied only to trade in merchandise goods; the WTO covers trade in goods, services and "trade in ideas" or intellectual property.
The WTO is based in Geneva, Switzerland. Its essential functions are:
- administering and implementing the multilateral and plurilateral trade agreements which together make up the WTO;
- acting as a forum for multilateral trade negotiations;
- seeking to resolve trade disputes;
- overseeing national trade policies (this means giving up some portion of national sovereignty); and.
- cooperating with other international institutions involved in global economic policy-making.
The Principles of the Trading System.
The WTO agreement contains some 29 individual legal texts - covering everything from agriculture to textiles and clothing, and from services to government procurement, rules of origin and intellectual property. Added to these are more than 25 additional Ministerial declarations, decisions and understandings which spell out further obligations and commitments for WTO members. However, a number of simple and fundamental principles run throughout all of these instruments which, together, make up the multilateral trading system.
Trade without discrimination.
There are a number of exceptions to Article I - notably that covering customs unions and free-trade areas. However, most-favoured-nation treatment generally ensures that developing countries and others with little economic leverage are able to benefit freely from the best trading conditions wherever and whenever they are negotiated.
A second form of non-discrimination known as "national treatment", requires that once goods have entered a market, they must be treated no less favourably than the equivalent domestically-produced goods. This is Article III of the GATT.
Apart from the revised GATT (known as "GATT 1994"), several other WTO agreements contain important provisions relating to MFN and national treatment. That on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) contains, with some exceptions, MFN and national treatment requirements relating to the provision of intellectual property protection by WTO members. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) requires members to offer MFN treatment to services and service suppliers of other members. However, it permits listed exemptions to the MFN obligation covering specific measures for which WTO members are unable to offer such treatment initially. Where such exemptions are taken, they are to be reviewed after five years and should not be maintained for more than ten years. On the other hand, national treatment is only an obligation in the GATS where members explicitly undertake to accord it for particular services or service activities. This means that national treatment is often the result of negotiations among members.
Other WTO agreements with non-discrimination provisions include those on rules of origin; preshipment inspection; trade-related investment measures ; and the application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures.
Predictable and growing access to markets.
The existence of secure and predictable market access is largely determined by the use of tariffs, or customs duties. While quotas are generally outlawed, tariffs are legal in the WTO and are commonly used by governments to protect domestic industries and to raise revenues. However, they are subject to disciplines - for instance, that they are not discriminatory among imports - and are increasingly "bound". Binding means that a tariff level for a particular product becomes a commitment by a WTO member and cannot be increased without compensation negotiations with its main trading partners (Article XXVIII of GATT 1994). Thus it is frequently the case that the extension of a customs union can lead to higher tariffs in some areas for which compensation negotiations are necessary.
Following the establishment of the GATT in 1948, average tariff levels fell progressively and dramatically through a series of seven trade rounds. The Uruguay Round added to that success, cutting tariffs substantially, sometimes to zero, while raising the overall level of bound tariffs significantly. The commitments on market access through tariff reductions made by over 120 countries in the Uruguay Round are contained in some 22,500 pages of national tariff schedules.
Tariff reductions, for the most part phased in over five years, will result in a 40 per cent cut in developed countries' tariffs on industrial products, from an average of 6.3 per cent to 3.8 per cent, and a jump from 20 to 44 per cent in the value of imported industrial products that receive duty-free treatment in developed countries. At the higher end of the tariff structure, the proportion of imports into developed countries from all sources that encounter tariffs above 15 per cent will decline from 7 to 5 per cent and from 9 to 5 per cent for imports from developing countries.
The Uruguay Round increased the percentage of bound product lines from 78 to 99 per cent for developed countries, 21 to 73 per cent for developing economies and from 73 to 98 per cent for economies in transition - results which are providing a substantially higher degree of market security for traders and investors.
The "tariffication" of all non-tariff import restrictions for agricultural products provided a substantial increase in the level of market predictability for agricultural products. More than 30% of agricultural produce had been subject to quotas or import restrictions. Virtually all such measures have now been converted to tariffs which, while initially providing substantially the same level of protection as previous non-tariff measures, are being reduced during the six years of implementation of the Uruguay Round agricultural agreement. The market access commitments on agriculture will also eliminate previous import bans on certain products.
While tariffs at the border do not exist for trade in services, there is no less a need for predictable conditions. To meet that need, governments undertook an initial set of commitments covering national regulations affecting various service activities. These commitments are, like those for tariffs, contained in binding national schedules and will be extended through further rounds of services negotiations in the future.
Many other WTO agreements seek to ensure conditions of investment and trade are more predictable by making it very difficult for member governments to change the rules of the game at whim. In almost every policy area which impinges on trading conditions, the scope of members to pursue capricious, discriminatory and protectionist policies is constrained by WTO commitments.
The key to predictable trading conditions is often the transparency of domestic laws, regulations and practices. Many WTO agreements contain transparency provisions which require disclosure at the national level - for instance, through publication in official journals or through enquiry points - or at the multilateral level through formal notifications to the WTO. Much of the work of WTO bodies is concerned with reviewing such notifications. The regular surveillance of national trade policies through the Trade Policy Review Mechanism provides a further means of encouraging transparency both domestically and at the multilateral level.
Promoting fair competition.
Rules on non-discrimination are designed to secure fair conditions of trade and so too are those on dumping and subsidies. Existing GATT rules, which laid down the basis on which governments could impose compensating duties on these two forms of "unfair" competition, were extended and clarified in WTO agreements.
The WTO agreement on agriculture is designed to provide fairness in farm trade. That on intellectual property will improve conditions of competition where ideas and inventions are involved, and the GATS will do the same thing for trade in services. The plurilateral agreement on government procurement will extend competition rules to purchases by thousands of "government" entities in many countries. There are plenty of other examples of WTO provisions which are designed to promote fair and undistorted competition.
Encouraging development and economic reform.
This trend effectively killed the notion that the trading system existed only for industrialized countries. It also changed the previous emphasis on exempting developing countries from certain GATT provisions and agreements. With the end of the Uruguay Round, developing countries showed themselves prepared to take on most of the obligations that are required of developed countries. They were, however, given transition periods to adjust to the more unfamiliar and, perhaps, difficult WTO provisions - particularly so for the poorest, "least-developed" countries. In addition, a Ministerial decision on measures in favour of least-developed countries gives extra flexibility to those countries in implementing WTO agreements; calls for an acceleration in the implementation of market access concessions affecting goods of export interest to those countries; and seeks increased technical assistance for them. Thus, the value to development of pursuing, as far as is reasonable, open market-oriented policies, based on WTO principles, is widely recognized. But so is the need for some flexibility with respect to the speed at which those policies are pursued.
Nevertheless, the provisions of the GATT intended to favour developing countries remain in place in the WTO. In particular, Part IV of GATT 1994 contains three articles, introduced in 1965, encouraging industrial countries to assist developing nation members "as a matter of conscious and purposeful effort" in their trading conditions and not to expect reciprocity for concessions made to developing countries in negotiations. A second measure, agreed at the end of the Tokyo Round in 1979 and normally referred to as the "enabling clause", provides a permanent legal basis for the market access concessions made by developed to developing countries under the generalized system of preferences (GSP).
The case for open trade.
The economic case for an open trading system based upon multilaterally agreed rules is simple enough and rests largely on commercial common sense.
All countries, including the poorest, have assets - human, industrial, natural, financial - which they can employ to produce goods and services for their domestic markets or to compete overseas. "Comparative advantage" means that countries prosper by taking advantage of their assets in order to concentrate on what they can produce best. This happens naturally for firms in the domestic market, but that is only half the story. The other half involves the world market. Most firms recognize that the bigger the market the greater their potential - in terms of achieving efficient scales of operation and having access to large numbers of customers. In other words, liberal trade policies which allow the unrestricted flow of goods, services and productive inputs multiply the rewards that come with producing the best products, with the best design, at the best price.
But trading success is not a static thing. Competitiveness in particular products can move from company to company when the market changes or new technologies make cheaper and better products possible. History and experience show that whole countries which have enjoyed an advantage, say, in the cost of labour or natural resources, can also become uncompetitive in some goods or services as their economies develop. However, with the stimulus of an open economy, they move on to become competitive elsewhere. This is, in general, a gradual process. For as much as the trading system is allowed to operate without the constraints of protectionism, firms are encouraged to adapt in an orderly and relatively painless way to focus on new products, finding either a new "niche" in their current area or expanding into new product areas.
The alternative of import protection and perpetual government subsidies leads to bloated, inefficient companies supplying consumers with outdated, unattractive products. Ultimately, factories close and jobs are lost despite protection and subsidies. If other governments pursue such policies overseas, markets contract and world economic activity is reduced. One of the objectives of the WTO is to prevent such a self-defeating and destructive drift into protectionism.
Vincent Ferraro, Ana Cristina Santos e Julie Ginocchio.
De 1686 a 1759, a lei francesa proibiu a importação de calicó impressos. Cerca de 16.000 pessoas perderam a vida como resultado desta lei, executada por violar a lei ou morto em distúrbios impulsionados pela oposição à lei. Agora é difícil imaginar a intensidade dos sentimentos gerados pelas disputas comerciais no passado: é improvável que o Congresso dos EUA impouse a pena de morte por dirigir uma Toyota. No entanto, as disputas comerciais continuam a suscitar emoções elevadas. À medida que a Guerra Fria retrocede como o principal foco das relações internacionais, os conflitos comerciais se tornarão mais freqüentes e mais intensos.
Do ponto de vista teórico, as disputas comerciais não deveriam existir. Afinal, a doutrina econômica pressupõe que as nações troquem livremente bens e serviços e que as forças impessoais da oferta e da procura determinem, presumivelmente, a alocação desses recursos. A busca de uma alocação de recursos mais eficiente, orientada pela doutrina da vantagem comparativa, é realizada por muitos como um objetivo genuinamente universal, compartilhado por todas as nações, independentemente da cultura, história, tempo ou espaço.
As nações, no entanto, como indivíduos, são motivadas por valores às vezes bastante diferentes e até inconsistentes com a eficiência econômica. Se as nações não negociassem entre si, cada nação poderia perseguir seus diferentes objetivos de forma consistente com a importância relativa de cada um. O comércio complica este processo de classificação: obriga as nações a negociar entre a eficiência e outros valores possíveis, como a equidade econômica, a estabilidade social, a proteção ambiental ou a representação política. A intrusão do comércio explica o seu significado político.
No início do período moderno, a maioria das nações na Europa simplesmente controlava o comércio para que sua intrusão pudesse ser gerenciada de forma rígida. O termo mercantilismo é geralmente usado para descrever esse sistema de controle. De um modo geral, as políticas mercantilistas foram destinadas a estimular as exportações e a deprimir as importações para que o país sempre tenha uma balança comercial favorável, políticas que foram possíveis em grande parte devido ao forte envolvimento do Estado na atividade econômica através de empresas comerciais e similares. O balanço comercial favorável representou uma acumulação de riqueza, que poderia servir como um recurso para as aspirações políticas e militares do estado. Naquele momento, não havia distinção significativa entre objetivos políticos e econômicos, ou, como Jacob Viner descreveu, entre poder e abundância.
As políticas utilizadas para apoiar os objetivos mercantilistas eram bastante diretas: a importação de certos produtos seria proibida por lei; a produção de certos produtos em colônias governadas por estados mercantilistas seria banida; Seriam concedidos subsídios aos produtores de exportações favorecidas; e o estado tomaria as medidas necessárias para assegurar uma marinha viável para o transporte de exportações. Além dessas políticas gerais, cada estado tinha medidas específicas que refletiam suas circunstâncias únicas, mas todas as políticas mercantilistas desse período refletem os fortes interesses políticos e econômicos do estado. Como argumentado por Edward Meade Earle em 1943:
Em suma, os fins do mercantilismo eram a unificação do estado nacional e o desenvolvimento de seus recursos industriais, comerciais, financeiros, militares e navais. Para alcançar esses fins, o Estado interveio nos assuntos econômicos, para que as atividades de seus cidadãos ou assuntos possam ser efetivamente desviados para canais, o que aumentaria o poder político e militar.
À medida que o capitalismo amadureceu e os direitos econômicos e políticos começaram a aderir aos indivíduos, a intervenção direta do Estado na administração da atividade econômica tornou-se menos necessária e menos desejável. Em The Wealth of Nations (1776), Adam Smith articulou um sistema econômico impulsionado pelos interesses privados dos indivíduos e não dos públicos do estado. Mais importante ainda, no entanto, Smith argumentou que uma "mão oculta" transformaria esses interesses privados e egoístas em benefício público - maior atividade econômica e um excedente econômico no qual o Estado poderia aproveitar, através da tributação, seus requisitos de segurança. Em outras palavras, o mercado livre poderia canalizar de forma mais eficiente a atividade econômica do que o estado de maneira que realmente aumentasse o poder do estado: a busca privada da abundância também poderia resultar na aquisição pública de poder.
A luta para realizar este quadro no país foi difícil e ainda não foi totalmente resolvida, exceto em alguns dos países industrializados avançados. Internacionalmente, a luta para criar um mercado livre foi significativamente mais difícil. Em 1817, o economista britânico David Ricardo escreveu The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, que ampliou o argumento de Smith ao comércio exterior e defendeu o livre comércio com base na vantagem comparativa. Ricardo tentou provar que se dois países se envolvessem em comércio, cada um deveria se especializar em produtos que ele produz relativamente bem: mesmo que um dos países seja melhor em produzir todos os produtos, ele ainda pode se beneficiar do comércio, enfatizando os produtos que ele produz melhor e importando esses produtos o que é relativamente ineficiente na produção. Desde o tempo de Ricardo, a doutrina econômica dominante aceitou essa proposição e argumentou que o comércio irrestrito resulta em uma produção amplamente expandida e, portanto, maior riqueza.
A luta para implementar e impor práticas mundiais de comércio livre foi liderada primeiro pela Grã-Bretanha e posteriormente pelos Estados Unidos. In truth, neither state fully subscribed to the principles of free trade, but the rhetorical support provided by each to the principles was almost religious, as well-described by Lord Maynard Keynes:
I was brought, like most Englishmen, to respect free trade not only as an economic doctrine, which a rational and instructed person could not doubt, but also almost as a part of the moral law. I regarded ordinary departures from it as being at the same time an imbecility and an outrage. I thought England's unshakable free trade convictions, maintained for nearly a hundred years, to be both the explanation before man and the justification before Heaven of her economic supremacy.
The British maintained a very elaborate and sophisticated set of trade preferences within the Empire but often abandoned its free trade practices outside the Empire whenever such exceptions seemed appropriate.
The Post World War II Trade Regime.
Nonetheless, the doctrine of free trade is an unquestionably powerful idea and since the end of World War II it has been championed by the United States and has served as the measure of determining governmental policy for many states in the international system. In the late 20th century, a very strong movement toward freeing trade further has occurred: the policies of some of the more protectionist states in the system-Brazil, China, India, Russia, and France-have moved toward strong liberalization. One should not interpret this movement as irreversible since attitudes toward trade historically can change very rapidly. But at this particular point in time, there is little question that free trade is being aggressively pursued by most of the major economic powers.
The idea of free trade is seductively simple: barriers to the free flow of goods and services, such as tariffs and quotas, should be reduced to zero. Individual entrepreneurs would invest their capital in those areas in which they would make the most profit. Global production would then increase dramatically as greater efficiencies of production are realized, and, as a result, the wealth of the world would increase.
There is no question that increased trade among nations shows a clear correlation with increased wealth on a global scale. In 1820 world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was estimated to be around $695 billion (US 1990$); by 1992 world GDP had increased to $27,995 billion (US 1990$). World exports were about $7 billion (US 1990$) in 1820 and by 1992 they had increased to about $3,786 billion (US 1990$). Stated another way, exports accounted for only about 1 percent of world product in 1820. By 1913 exports accounted for about 8.7 percent, and by 1992 the figure was about 13.5 percent. Increased trade is certainly partially responsible for the dramatic increase in wealth in the last two centuries.
Trade is also heavily concentrated. The top ten exporters accounted for over sixty percent of global exports; the top ten importers accounted for almost 58 percent of world imports (See Table 1). Indeed, the top fifty exporters accounted for 96.1 percent of all world exports, which means that around 135 countries only account for 3.9 percent of world exports. This concentration of trade reflects the concentration of global economic activity and does not suggest that trade cannot be of crucial importance to small countries.
One can also support free trade because its alternative, protectionism, is viewed as a dangerous policy. The commitment of the United States to free trade can be partially explained by the disastrous experience of the United States during the Great Depression. The decision of the United States to erect significant tariff barriers against foreign products as a way of stimulating internal demand was entirely counterproductive and led instead to a deepening of the Depression. While the decision to raise tariffs, most dramatically in the case of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, was consistent with most of American economic history, the leaders of the United States decided that its post-World War II economic policies would be quite different, and they adopted a strong free trade position as the hallmark of American power. Thus, the United States helped create and maintain the Bretton Woods System whose institutions-the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)-were committed to free trade.
Top Ten Global Exporters and Importers of Merchandise.
1995 (billions of US$)
Exporter Value Share of World Exports Importer Value Share of World Imports.
United States 583.9 11.6 United States 771.3 14.9.
Germany 508.5 10.1 Germany 443.2 8.6.
Japan 443.1 8.8 Japan 336.0 6.5.
France 286.2 5.7 France 274.5 5.3.
United Kingdom 242.1 4.8 United Kingdom 265.3 5.1.
Italy 231.2 4.6 Italy 204.0 3.9.
Netherlands 195.3 3.9 Hong Kong* 196.1 3.8.
Canada 192.2 3.8 Netherlands 175.9 3.4.
Hong Kong* 173.9 3.5 Canada 168.4 3.3.
Bel-Luxembourg 168.3 3.3 Bel-Luxembourg 154.2 3.0.
Source: World Trade Organization, Focus, No. 14 (December 1996), wto/wto/Whats_new/focus14.pdf, p. 5.
*Hong Kong had domestic exports of $29.9 billion and re-exported $143.9 billion. Its retained imports in 1995 totaled $52.1 billion.
Although not the most powerful of these institutions, the GATT is the organization most centrally concerned with establishing the global free trade regime. In 1945 the United States invited twenty-two other nations to join it in drafting an agreement that would multilaterally reduce tariffs and other barriers to trade. The negotiations held in Geneva in 1947 resulted in the GATT, which at that time was only provisional. The plan was to incorporate eventually the GATT into the proposed International Trade Organization (ITO). The ITO never came into being because of opposition, primarily from the United States, to its powers of regulating trade. The GATT took over some of the duties of the stillborn ITO, such as settling disputes and providing information about tariffs and quotas.
Over the years more countries joined the GATT, and the Contracting Parties felt the need to meet in what came to be known as trade negotiating rounds. Eight such rounds have taken place, the last three being the longest and most important: the Kennedy, Tokyo, and Uruguay Rounds.
The Kennedy Round was initiated in 1962 and concluded in 1967. Its major contribution was the introduction of multilateral trade negotiations. Previously the common practice had been to settle tariffs item by item. The new procedure introduced by the Kennedy Round treated every tariff as roughly comparable: if an item was not listed as an exception by a country, its tariff would be set at the general rate agreed upon by the country. Additionally, four main issues were discussed at the Kennedy Round: industrial tariffs, agriculture, non-tariff barriers, and the integration of developing countries into the global economy through trade. Progress on reducing industrial tariffs was quite successful: the value of trade covered was about $40 billion and the talks affected about 40 percent of the goods imported by industrialized countries. Progress was more limited in the remaining three issue areas: agricultural restrictions proved intractable due to the political significance of farming in many countries; non-tariff barriers, such as quality standards and labeling regulations, were difficult to identify and assess; and the problems of overcoming poverty in developing countries by facilitating their trade through preferences involved concessions the industrialized countries were unwilling to make.
Despite the successes in reducing industrial tariffs, the Kennedy Round failed to meet the expectations of many of the participants. One of its biggest drawbacks was that the negotiators continued to rely upon the reciprocity clause: a country would reduce its tariffs only if its trading partners did likewise. Countries were unwilling to import more unless its exports increased by a similar amount. Developing countries were also not treated as full participants in the negotiations: the United States, the European Economic Community, and Japan dominated the discussions.
The Tokyo Round opened in 1972, triggered by the withdrawal of the United States from the gold standard in 1971. Ninety-nine countries, members and non-members of GATT, participated in the extensive negotiations that would only be concluded seven years later. The Round resulted in the reduction of hundreds of tariffs and steps toward the quantification and elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade. Six major Codes of Conduct were articulated, including the Standards Code, which attempted to regulate non-tariff barriers. As was the case with the Kennedy Round, actual adherence to these new standards has been quite spotty, and, again, developing countries were not offered structural concessions.
The world had recognized that poorer countries need different treatment in the area of trade. There are two major trading institutions which try to compensate for the difficulties faced by poorer countries: the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and the tariff preferences extended to 70 African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries through the European Union's Lome IV Convention. These two systems grant lower tariffs, and, in some cases, duty free status to developing countries. The system of preferences certainly made it easier for poor countries to export their traditional products, but it also made it difficult for them to diversify their exports, particularly toward manufactured and semi-manufactured products. As the world moves closer toward a lowering of all MFN tariffs, however, the advantages offered by these two systems will inherently decline.
The Uruguay Round was the most important and most comprehensive of all rounds. Initiated on September 20, 1986 in Punta del Este, it was stalled for three years due to conflicts between the United States and the European Union over agricultural trade. The credibility of multilateral negotiations was at stake during those years; if the disputes had not been settled, the global framework of international trade might have succumbed to protectionism and bilateral agreements. A compromise was reached in December 1993 in Geneva, and the final text was signed the following March in Marrakech.
The Uruguay Round was a watershed in the history of the GATT. The jurisdiction of the agreement was extended to issues which many countries had reserved to their national sovereignty: services, textiles, and agriculture. The establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) was its greatest accomplishment. The WTO has the power to actually resolve disputes, putting an end to further multilateral rounds of negotiations. Unlike GATT decisions, those made by the WTO are binding. More complex and far-reaching then the GATT, the WTO is the successor to GATT (and the reincarnation of the ITO).
Established in Geneva on January 1, 1995, the WTO already has over 120 members. Its additional functions include implementing all multilateral trade agreements and overseeing national trade policies. In December 1996, the WTO held its first biennial Ministerial Conference in Singapore, and concluded the Information Technology Act which dealt with matters concerning protection of intellectual property rights associated with new electronic technologies. The Ministerial Conference is the WTO's highest authority, and is composed of the trade ministers from every single member. Several bodies and committees work around a General Council in the Geneva headquarters of the WTO. So far, only minor issues have been turned over to the WTO for resolution (such as bananas and Costa Rican underwear). At this stage it is impossible to assess the effectiveness of the WTO: the question of whether it will be able to enforce its decisions in those cases remains an open question.
Exceptions to a Global Free Trade Regime: Regional Trading Blocs.
The WTO will be operating in a global environment, which is, in some respects, more favorable to the idea of freer trade, but organized along regional lines. Article XXIV of the GATT allows for regional institutions to establish their own free trade areas as potential way stations to a global regime:
The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies of the countries parties to such agreements.
There are many such agreements in the world, but these agreements are far from uniform in scope. There are different levels of integration in the world, and each regional organization deals with the issue of national sovereignty differently. A free trade area (FTA) is the simplest form of trade alliance: barriers to trade only among member states are lowered, and each country remains independent with respect to non-members of the FTA. Custom Unions go one step further: they establish a common external tariff (CET) which applied uniformly to non-members. At the most sophisticated level of regional integration, nations form a common market in which there is, in addition to free mobility of the factors of production (capital and labor), a common trade policy and the harmonizing of national economic legislation.
The process of regional integration has grown steadily since the end of World War II. In the early 1950s many believed that the tensions between France and Germany could only be reduced if the two were tied together economically. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was created, and it served as a stepping-stone to the Treaty of Rome (1957) which gave birth to the European Economic Community (EEC). The EEC has evolved over the years and is still involved in arduous negotiations to achieve a higher level of political and economic integration, including the creation of a common currency. From an initial group of six, it now consists of fifteen countries, and other nations have applied for membership.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Mercosur are more recent regional trade alliances. NAFTA was signed by the United States, Canada, and Mexico in 1992, and entered into force on January 1, 1994. The Treaty of Asunción, which created Mercosur, was signed by Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay in March 1991, and was implemented on January 1, 1995. As of now, both agreements are free trade areas, which aim to withdraw all barriers to the exchange of goods, services, and capital only among the member nations. Mercosur, however, plans to eventually become a common market and follow the European example; it is now, however, only a semi-functioning customs union.
Both NAFTA and Mercosur are currently reviewing membership applications from other Latin American nations, and, at the Summit of the Americas in 1994, thirty-four countries supported the creation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The path toward such integration will not be an easy one, especially because the area involved is much more heterogeneous than Europe. Some initial efforts have been made, but it remains to be seen if the United States in particular is willing to pursue and support some form of hemispheric integration.
Overall, regional trading blocs account for about 61 percent of all trade, a very high percentage. C. Fred Bergsten estimates the different shares for the main blocs in the world today:
Regional Free Trade Arrangements.
(share of world trade, 1994)
European Union 22.8.
Free Trade Area of the Americas 2.6.
Australia-New Zealand 0.1.
Source: C. Fred Bergsten, "Competitive Liberalization and Global Free Trade: A Vision for the Early 21st Century, Institute for International Economics, APEC Working Paper 96-15, 1996, iie:80/9615.htm.
Quite clearly, the regional trading blocs are highly significant actors in world trade. Their danger is that, although they are expected to be mere way stations to a global free trade regime, they also represent institutional interests that may actually restrict trade.
Exceptions to a Global Free Trade Regime: Economic Protection.
By far the most important exceptions to free trade come from pressures to protect a domestic economy from international competition. The techniques for such protection include tariffs, quotas, export subsidies, government procurement policies, quality, safety, and health regulations, and a whole host of other pricing mechanisms. In 1993, the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimated that protectionist measures cost the global economy about $450 billion a year. At the global level, the arguments supporting free trade are probably unassailable: free trade unquestionably stimulates more efficient production and, as we have seen, greater wealth.
Nations, however, are not asked to defend a global perspective; they are expected to defend national interests. While free trade may actually create jobs by stimulating demand and lowering prices, free trade cannot guarantee that those who lose their jobs because of their higher wages will be hired to fill the new jobs created by the economic stimulus. It is this asymmetry of benefits, distributed unequally among different countries, and among different products and different workers, which creates powerful opposition to free trade.
Quantifying the effects of freer trade is extraordinarily difficult, as demonstrated by the problems in determining the effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on the U. S. and Mexican economies. A recent study conducted by the University of California at Los Angeles suggests that the overall effects of NAFTA since it was signed in 1994 have been quite modest:
Using a new model of how exports and imports influence jobs in various product categories and regions, the study estimated that the net job gain to the United States since the agreement took effect at the beginning of 1994 has been just 2,990 jobs. The net figure, however, masked a much greater level of both job losses and gains among different companies. Increased imports to the United States killed an estimated 28,168 jobs the last three years, the study said, while increased exports supported creation of 31,158 jobs.
Obviously the people who lost their jobs or their businesses feel that NAFTA was a bad decision. The people who gained jobs or who benefited from lower prices for the products they purchased feel that NAFTA was a good decision. The difficulty for a policy maker is determining what the overall effect on the national economy is by freer trade, including the costs of addressing the needs of those who lose their jobs or businesses.
Those who support greater protection against economic competition from abroad argue that domestic producers will move to countries where cheaper labor is available, or where regulations, such as environmental or safety controls, are minimal. Indeed, the logic of free trade is that producers ought to move to places in which higher profits can be made so, to the extent that such considerations are important, one would expect changes of this nature. It is difficult to determine, however, the extent to which such considerations are decisive. For example, there has not been a documented massive shift of manufacturing from the United States to Mexico or to any other country in which labor costs are substantially lower than in the United States. The manufacturing share of the U. S. economy has not drastically changed in the past thirty years (21% of the U. S. economy). It is clear that lower labor costs or reduced regulations are not the sole determinants of business decisions to relocate: in some cases they may be, but it other cases, access to skilled labor or the presence of a sophisticated infrastructure may be more important.
What is clear is that appeals to protection from free trade constitute a powerful political issue. There is no question that some jobs have been lost because of NAFTA and many believe that the U. S. Government has a responsibility to protect Americans from job erosion. Presidential hopeful Pat Buchanan made this issue a central part of his campaign in 1996:
To "conservatives of the heart," even if NAFTA brings an uptick in GNP it is no good for America. No matter the cash benefits, we don't want to merge our economy with Mexico. We don't want to force American workers to compete with dollar-an-hour Mexican labor. That's not what America is all about.
In many countries there are provisions for helping workers whose jobs are lost due to trade, but it is hard to assert that those programs are especially successful. By and large, trade-displaced workers are older, less educated, and less mobile than workers who are attractive to the more dynamic sectors of an economy.
Additionally, one should always be aware that justifications for trade protection are also defenses of relative inefficiency. Tariffs and quotas are costs to an economy, ones usually borne by the consumer. They can protect workers, but, in the process, they can also protect the private corporate interests of those who hire the workers. In the early 1980s the automobile industry in the United States was at a competitive disadvantage to Japanese producers and lobbied for protection against imported automobiles. After a quota was implemented, the prices of automobiles when up rather dramatically. The American industry announced that the quota saved about 22,000 jobs. The quota also increased the profits of the industry. However, the price increase led to a sales drop of about one million cars which in turn led to a loss of about 50,000 jobs in the industry.
Exceptions to a Global Free Trade Regime: National Security Concerns.
The ideal of global free trade faces a challenge when viewed in light of national security concerns. Nations do not wish to export products to their adversaries which might have the effect of enhancing their relative power, even if the private interests producing those products have an interest in increasing their sales. During the Cold War, the economic benefits of free trade were overridden in many cases by national and multilateral export controls on strategically sensitive products. The formal agency responsible for maintaining these controls was the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) aimed to protect the West's security interests by placing restrictions on nuclear, conventional, and dual-use technologies that might have strengthened the Soviet's military position in the Cold War. COCOM, established in 1949, included Japan and all of the NATO countries except Iceland.
COCOM restrictions on strategic trade were partially effective in limiting the transfer of strategic materials to the Soviet bloc, but were never wholly successful. It proved to be extremely difficult to identify which products were of strategic value. For example, in 1972 the United States gave the Bryant Grinder Corporation authorization for a shipment of precision miniature ball-bearing grinders to the Soviet Union, which later proved to be used in Soviet guided ballistic missiles. Other COCOM states had also shipped similar types of equipment to the Soviet Union. Similarly, computer technology proved to be extraordinarily difficult to define in strategic terms: many items could be used for military purposes, and it was impossible to define those items, which could not somehow be adapted for strategic purposes.
The end of the Cold War has lessened the possibilities for effective controls over strategic exports, and COCOM was dissolved on March 31, 1994. The need to control such material however, still persists, particularly over those materials and technologies used in nuclear weapons production and delivery. Currently, the effort to restrict such exports is guided by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) which was formed in 1987. There are about 25 nations which have announced adherence to these controls which are described by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in these terms:
The MTCR is neither a treaty nor an international agreement but is a voluntary arrangement among countries which share a common interest in arresting missile proliferation. The Regime consists of common export guidelines applied to a common list of controlled items. Each member implements its commitments in the context of its own national export laws.
Such controls have never been regarded as inconsistent with a free trade regime, but if the definition of strategic were to expand significantly to include many computer and information technologies, the effects on international trade may be considerable.
Exceptions to a Global Free Trade Regime: Human Rights.
Trade is often used as a mechanism for influencing the policies of states. The United States signaled its displeasure at the Japanese invasion of Manchuria by cutting off certain vital exports to Japan. The loss of its supplies of oil and iron ore simply reinforced the position of those in Japan who argued that further armed expansion was the only solution to the vulnerability of a relatively resource-less island. On the other hand, the trade embargo against South Africa, while far from complete, ultimately succeeded in persuading the Nationalist Government that continued isolation from the rest of the world was more costly to South Africa than the establishment of majority rule. In both cases, trade was manipulated as a diplomatic instrument to achieve a certain objective.
Many simply disagree with the use of trade as a policy tool. For them, economics should follow its own logic and its purposes should not be subordinated to the political interests of the state. This position suggests that, over time, the forces of economics will slowly persuade states to cooperate more effectively, no matter what the ideological or political differences among them. Moreover, many argue that using trade as a lever for inducing change is simply ineffective. The failure of the United States embargo against Cuba to force a change in the Cuban government is a case in point.
There is probably no way to separate trade from politics, and it would be naïve to suggest otherwise. Trade restrictions are often reflections of domestic politics within states much more than they are actually well considered mechanisms of change. Perhaps the most visible case of trade politics in recent years has been the dispute between the United States and the People's Republic of China over a U. S. extension of Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) status to the Chinese.
Most-Favored-Nation status simply means that the restrictions on trade between two nations will be no more onerous than the least restrictions offered to any other single state with whom trade occurs. The status does not confer any special advantage: it merely prohibits a specific disadvantage which could possibly be directed against a single state. MFN is a crucially important status because it allows states to compete more or less equally within the global trading network.
As China has become one of the most significant factors in United States trade, importing in 1995 about $12 billion from the United States and exporting about $45 billion to the united States, the question of whether China should be granted MFN status has become critically important. There are some who oppose MFN status to China simply because they believe that the United States cannot compete with Chinese products, and an influx of Chinese goods would cost Americans jobs, arguments similar to those developed earlier in the section on protectionism. There are others, however, who argue that the absence of political freedoms in China renders China an unfit trading partner. They suggest that the United States should threaten to restrict Chinese exports to the United States unless China adopts a system of human rights more compatible with Western values.
There is very little question that the Chinese have a profoundly different system of politics than does the United States. Moreover, there is very little question that many Americans find Chinese practices, particularly the treatment of political dissidents, to be abhorrent. It is difficult, however, to accept the proposition that American political practices should be the standard by which all nations should be judged. Indeed, the United States itself might be found lacking in adherence to its own principles in many respects. The Chinese argue that its internal political system accurately reflects the values of its society, and that its internal politics are not subject to evaluation or judgment by outsiders. In some respects, the world has already answered this objection. The precedents established by the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials after World War II effectively dismissed the possibility of politics ever being a purely "domestic" matter-the position was only reinforced by subsequent actions against South Africa.
Which side is right? Initially, the United States took the position in 1993 that MFN status would not be conferred unless human rights practices in China changed dramatically. Subsequently, however, the United States changed its position, and, in 1996, granted China MFN status for a year. Presumably, that status will be renewed unless Chinese actions change dramatically for the worse.
In some sense, the Chinese had clearly won a victory over United States policy-trade would flow freely between the two nations, and no conditions were imposed on Chinese behavior. Nonetheless, this interpretation of the outcome is overly simple. United States pressure certainly discomfited the Chinese, and the publicity surrounding certain dissidents in China and the possibilities of prison labor for profit damaged China's reputation globally.
The more important point, however, was much simpler: the United States decided that its ability to influence Chinese domestic political practice through trade was minimal. This pragmatic observation led to the decision that opening trade further might lead to political changes within China more rapidly than a coercive approach, which tried to punish China for its human rights practices. As is the case with most pragmatic decisions, time will tell.
Exceptions to a Global Free Trade Regime: Environmental Protection.
The most recent exceptions to the free trade system revolve around the growing concern over how environmental regulations may be subverted by corporations moving their operations to states with lax environmental controls. There is scant systematic evidence to document how extensive this problem may be, but there are a number of examples which suggest that the problem may be widespread. Arlene Wilson of the Congressional Research Service observed that "a number of studies have shown that trade liberalization may reduce a country's overall welfare if environmental resources are incorrectly priced." It is difficult, however, to know how to price correctly environmental protection, particularly since, in the international arena, attitudes toward balancing the values of economic development and environmental protection may differ profoundly.
In making environmental standards a part of NAFTA, the United States, Canada, and Mexico have set the stage for increased debate between environmental activist organizations and advocates for freer trade. The NAFTA set up a side agreement known as the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC). This agreement provides a mechanism in which disputes over environmental regulations may be settled outside of the NAFTA framework.
Environmentalists feared that American businesses would flock to Mexico to produce more cheaply by avoiding costly U. S. environmental regulations. There is not yet sufficient information to assess whether this fear was or is justified. There seems to be wide consensus that "dirty" industries "have expanded faster in developing countries than the average rate for all industries over the last two decades - and faster than in industrial countries. It is uncertain, however, whether this international pattern merely reflects growth - or industrial migration as well." The creation of the side agreement was clearly an initiative sparked by domestic concerns within the United States, and the rhetorical level of support for environmental protection was quite high. Former Secretary of State Warren Christopher affirmed that the United States is "striving through the new World Trade Organization to reconcile the complex tensions between promoting trade and protecting the environment-and to ensure that neither comes at the expense of the other." Whether this balance can be attained remains to be seen. It is unlikely that freer trade would substantially increase the opportunities for new environmental degradation; it might, however, certainly intensify current problems.
The Critique of the Free Trade Regime.
The exceptions to the practice of free trade listed above are generally regarded as practical concessions to the political realities of the international system; they are, in some respects, modifications or reforms designed to accommodate interests which find the demands of the free market inconsistent with other values such as equality and justice. There are many, however, who believe that free trade cannot be reconciled with these other values. These critics argue that the free trade regime is in fact a political system-an imperialist system-engineered to maintain the power of the advanced industrialized countries at the expense of the poorer countries.
There are a number of variations to this argument and it is simply impossible to develop them in any detail in this essay. Marxists, dependency theorist, and liberal reformers all share some basic elements of the critique. What separates their analyses is the extent to which the system can be changed, what the nature of those changes have to be, and whether the changes have to involve the fundamental premises of the capitalist system.
The analysis of the problem is straightforward: free trade favors the more developed economies and this bias channels wealth from the poor to the rich. This process has been going on for centuries and the cumulative effect of the bias is the growing income gap between rich and poor. Powerful states, therefore, adopt free trade because it increases their power. Bismarck once noted that:
England had the highest protective duties until she had been so strengthened under the protection that she came forward as a herculean fighter and challenged everybody with, 'Enter the lists with me.' She is the strongest pugilist in the arena of competition, and is ever ready to assert the right of the strongest in trade.
From this perspective, free trade is nothing more than a mercantilist policy designed to enhance the power of a state relative to others.
The critics of free trade argue that the openness of the free trade regime exposes poorer countries to competition, which is patently unfair. Rich countries have access to capital, technology, transportation, and markets, which are generally unavailable to poorer countries. The poor countries can sell their labor and their land in the form of primary commodities. Both of these factors of production are in great supply and therefore the demand for them is low. Free trade, therefore, creates a context in which poor countries have few avenues of escape: their products are less valuable than the products of the rich countries and their relative poverty only increases the more they participate in the free trade regime.
The critics of the free trade regime stand solidly on their description of the international distribution of wealth. Since the mid-1800s, wealth and income have become increasingly concentrated in the industrialized nations. There is little question that poor countries have had a more difficult time catching up to the rich countries as free trade practices have become more global. The liberalizing of trade after the Tokyo Round did not significantly improve the status of poorer countries:
Since the end of the Tokyo Round in 1979, the average level of industrial tariffs in developed countries has fallen by nearly a half to 6.4 per cent and the value of total world merchandise trade has grown by a remarkable 4.8 per cent per year. This growth is mainly confined to the industrialized countries: in the 1980s, developing countries' exports grew by only l.6 per cent, and their share of world trade fell from 28 to 21 per cent.
There is no question that some developing countries have benefited from the expansion of trade opportunities in the post-World War H period. Many countries in East Asia -- Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Taiwan, and South Korea -- deliberately pursued an export-led strategy that resulted in impressive growth in their Gross Domestic Products. However, other countries have not been able to use trade as an "engine of growth." These countries, many of them in Africa, export primary commodities for which demand has been declining over time. The expansion of free trade into the agricultural sectors of these economies poses serious threats to the fanning communities in many of these areas. While it is probably safe to say that free trade will always benefit the wealthy, one must be more cautious in implementing free trade commitments for the poor. For them, trade will never be enough.
Challenges to the Future of the World Trading System.
There are three primary concerns that have emerged out of the recent expansion of the free trade regime. The first is over the ways by which the trade system is connected to the larger economic process of globalization. The World Trade Organization, in its Annual Report for 1995, notes the significance of the connection:
In virtually every year of the postwar period, the growth of world merchandise trade has exceeded the growth of world merchandise output. Overall, the volume of world merchandise trade is estimated to have increased at an average annual rate of slightly more than 6 per cent during the period 1950-94, compared with close to 4 per cent for world output. This means each 10 per cent increase in world output has on average been associated with a 16 per cent increase in world trade. During those 45 years, world merchandise output has multiplied 5½ times and world trade has multiplied 14 times, both in real terms.
Nations trade because there are differences in production possibilities and costs among nations. While some of these factors are fixed, others, like the cost of labor, are not. When production changes location because of these differences in costs, the demand for these factors of production changes as well. For example, the demand for high-wage labor may be reduced because of the availability of low-wage labor, which then leads to a reduction in the high wages. We know that this transformation has in fact occurred, since trade is increasing at a faster rate than production.
The fear that freer trade will depress high wages and lead to a mass exodus of jobs from the industrialized countries to the lower wage poorer countries is genuine, and manifests itself in a vision of a global network of sweatshops. As suggested above, there is little systematic or global evidence to document the extent to which this fear is legitimate. But the most important issue facing the WTO is the internationalization of standards-labor and environmental-implicit in the process of opening trade even further.
The issue is extremely complicated. Evening out the differences vitiates the efficiencies gained by comparative advantage; ignoring the differences assures strong political opposition to opening up markets. Further, there is no way to measure accurately the quality of life standards raised by questions concerning wages and environmental protection-what is a decent, living wage? What is a "clean" environment? How does one account for the cultural variations in the definitions of these criteria? Finally, the internationalization of these standards poses a serious challenge to the idea of state sovereignty. When an international organization such as the WTO or the International Labour Organization (ILO) begins to dictate working conditions within a country, serious questions arise about the ability of states to manage their own domestic affairs.
The second major challenge facing the world trading system concerns its ability to enforce its rules. The conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the creation of the WTO reflect the economic and political power of "new" entrants to the global economy: most importantly China and the states of the former Soviet Union. Additional impetus for the new structures came from states that changed their trade policies toward more liberalized trade: India and Brazil. The more traditional supporters of free trade, the United States and several of the European states, actually saw domestic support for free trade decline.
That free trade expanded under recent conditions is not especially surprising in light of historical experience: in good economic times, free trade typically expands. The real strength of the new trade regime will be tested when an economic downturn occurs. Under conditions of economic stress, domestic pressures for protectionist measures increase dramatically. The WTO has a Dispute Settlement Body and an Appellate Body to enforce the rulings of the WTO, but the general effect of these enforcement mechanisms thus far has been to persuade nations to resolve their disputes "out of court." Such resolutions of trade disputes are important and should not be discounted; nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether the WTO has the ability to enforce unpopular decisions on powerful states.
The third and final challenge to the world trading system is the presence, persistence, and expansion of global poverty. It is a mistake to think that the WTO can address this problem on its own. It is also a mistake, however, to think that an uncritical pursuit of free trade will help all countries equally. One of the clear characteristics of trade is that it rather faithfully represents the distribution of economic power in the international system. That some poor countries have been able to use trade to stimulate their economies to grow at rather rapid rates is an important reason to support free trade in principle. But it cannot be used as a blanket justification for policies that expose very poor societies to economic competition that undermines their viability.
The current distribution of wealth is not defensible, either in moral or in practical terms. There are far too many people on the planet who lead lives of total desperation: over a billion people are malnourished, ill housed, and cut off from adequate education, medical care, clean water, and a safe environment. Free trade will not, on its own, pull these people into prosperity. Moreover, in a free trade regime, the economic fortunes of the rich countries are inextricably linked to the fortunes of the poor. Free trade has a convergence effect, although the power of that effect is not clearly measurable. if industries do migrate to low wage areas, then the tendency will be for high wages to fall. At some point, the reduction in wages will have a depressing effect on demand for products and this reduction will unquestionably lead to lower rates of economic growth, perhaps even negative growth rates.
This challenge to the free trade regime is not dramatic or immediate, but it is inexorable. Nor does it suggest that free trade itself should be abandoned as a general principle. But the challenge of global poverty demands that richer countries think about trade as a way of helping poor nations integrate more successfully into the global economy. Such integration will require concessions to protect the weak economic infrastructures of many countries from the rather unforgiving rigors of free trade.
The foundations of the world trading system.
If you wish to get more information about World Trade Organization, just click WTO. Its URL is: wto. As WTO updates its site periodically, some of these documents are not readily accessible. To assist students, however, some items are copied below. These documents originated in the WTO websites, and Kwan Choi is NOT the author.
What is the World Trade Organization?
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the legal and institutional foundation of the multilateral trading system. It provides the principal contractual obligations determining how governments frame and implement domestic trade legislation and regulations. And it is the platform on which trade relations among countries evolve through collective debate, negotiation and adjudication.
The WTO was established on 1 January 1995. Governments had concluded the Uruguay Round negotiations on December 15, 1993 and Ministers had given their political backing to the results by signing the Final Act at a meeting in Marrakesh, Morocco in April 1994. The 'Marrakesh Declaration' of 15 April 1994, affirmed that the results of the Uruguay Round would "strengthen the world economy and lead to more trade, investment, employment and income growth throughout the world". The WTO is the embodiment of the Uruguay Round results and the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
Out of a potential membership of 152 countries and territories, 76 governments became members of the WTO on its first day, with some 50 other governments at various stages of completing their domestic ratification procedures, and the remainder engaged in negotiating their terms of entry.
Not only does the WTO have a potentially larger membership than GATT (128 by the end of 1994), it also has a much broader scope in terms of the commercial activity and trade policies to which it applies. The GATT applied only to trade in merchandise goods; the WTO covers trade in goods, services and "trade in ideas" or intellectual property.
The WTO is based in Geneva, Switzerland. Its essential functions are:
- administering and implementing the multilateral and plurilateral trade agreements which together make up the WTO;
- acting as a forum for multilateral trade negotiations;
- seeking to resolve trade disputes;
- overseeing national trade policies (this means giving up some portion of national sovereignty); and.
- cooperating with other international institutions involved in global economic policy-making.
The Principles of the Trading System.
The WTO agreement contains some 29 individual legal texts - covering everything from agriculture to textiles and clothing, and from services to government procurement, rules of origin and intellectual property. Added to these are more than 25 additional Ministerial declarations, decisions and understandings which spell out further obligations and commitments for WTO members. However, a number of simple and fundamental principles run throughout all of these instruments which, together, make up the multilateral trading system.
Trade without discrimination.
There are a number of exceptions to Article I - notably that covering customs unions and free-trade areas. However, most-favoured-nation treatment generally ensures that developing countries and others with little economic leverage are able to benefit freely from the best trading conditions wherever and whenever they are negotiated.
A second form of non-discrimination known as "national treatment", requires that once goods have entered a market, they must be treated no less favourably than the equivalent domestically-produced goods. This is Article III of the GATT.
Apart from the revised GATT (known as "GATT 1994"), several other WTO agreements contain important provisions relating to MFN and national treatment. That on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) contains, with some exceptions, MFN and national treatment requirements relating to the provision of intellectual property protection by WTO members. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) requires members to offer MFN treatment to services and service suppliers of other members. However, it permits listed exemptions to the MFN obligation covering specific measures for which WTO members are unable to offer such treatment initially. Where such exemptions are taken, they are to be reviewed after five years and should not be maintained for more than ten years. On the other hand, national treatment is only an obligation in the GATS where members explicitly undertake to accord it for particular services or service activities. This means that national treatment is often the result of negotiations among members.
Other WTO agreements with non-discrimination provisions include those on rules of origin; preshipment inspection; trade-related investment measures ; and the application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures.
Predictable and growing access to markets.
The existence of secure and predictable market access is largely determined by the use of tariffs, or customs duties. While quotas are generally outlawed, tariffs are legal in the WTO and are commonly used by governments to protect domestic industries and to raise revenues. However, they are subject to disciplines - for instance, that they are not discriminatory among imports - and are increasingly "bound". Binding means that a tariff level for a particular product becomes a commitment by a WTO member and cannot be increased without compensation negotiations with its main trading partners (Article XXVIII of GATT 1994). Thus it is frequently the case that the extension of a customs union can lead to higher tariffs in some areas for which compensation negotiations are necessary.
Following the establishment of the GATT in 1948, average tariff levels fell progressively and dramatically through a series of seven trade rounds. The Uruguay Round added to that success, cutting tariffs substantially, sometimes to zero, while raising the overall level of bound tariffs significantly. The commitments on market access through tariff reductions made by over 120 countries in the Uruguay Round are contained in some 22,500 pages of national tariff schedules.
Tariff reductions, for the most part phased in over five years, will result in a 40 per cent cut in developed countries' tariffs on industrial products, from an average of 6.3 per cent to 3.8 per cent, and a jump from 20 to 44 per cent in the value of imported industrial products that receive duty-free treatment in developed countries. At the higher end of the tariff structure, the proportion of imports into developed countries from all sources that encounter tariffs above 15 per cent will decline from 7 to 5 per cent and from 9 to 5 per cent for imports from developing countries.
The Uruguay Round increased the percentage of bound product lines from 78 to 99 per cent for developed countries, 21 to 73 per cent for developing economies and from 73 to 98 per cent for economies in transition - results which are providing a substantially higher degree of market security for traders and investors.
The "tariffication" of all non-tariff import restrictions for agricultural products provided a substantial increase in the level of market predictability for agricultural products. More than 30% of agricultural produce had been subject to quotas or import restrictions. Virtually all such measures have now been converted to tariffs which, while initially providing substantially the same level of protection as previous non-tariff measures, are being reduced during the six years of implementation of the Uruguay Round agricultural agreement. The market access commitments on agriculture will also eliminate previous import bans on certain products.
While tariffs at the border do not exist for trade in services, there is no less a need for predictable conditions. To meet that need, governments undertook an initial set of commitments covering national regulations affecting various service activities. These commitments are, like those for tariffs, contained in binding national schedules and will be extended through further rounds of services negotiations in the future.
Many other WTO agreements seek to ensure conditions of investment and trade are more predictable by making it very difficult for member governments to change the rules of the game at whim. In almost every policy area which impinges on trading conditions, the scope of members to pursue capricious, discriminatory and protectionist policies is constrained by WTO commitments.
The key to predictable trading conditions is often the transparency of domestic laws, regulations and practices. Many WTO agreements contain transparency provisions which require disclosure at the national level - for instance, through publication in official journals or through enquiry points - or at the multilateral level through formal notifications to the WTO. Much of the work of WTO bodies is concerned with reviewing such notifications. The regular surveillance of national trade policies through the Trade Policy Review Mechanism provides a further means of encouraging transparency both domestically and at the multilateral level.
Promoting fair competition.
Rules on non-discrimination are designed to secure fair conditions of trade and so too are those on dumping and subsidies. Existing GATT rules, which laid down the basis on which governments could impose compensating duties on these two forms of "unfair" competition, were extended and clarified in WTO agreements.
The WTO agreement on agriculture is designed to provide fairness in farm trade. That on intellectual property will improve conditions of competition where ideas and inventions are involved, and the GATS will do the same thing for trade in services. The plurilateral agreement on government procurement will extend competition rules to purchases by thousands of "government" entities in many countries. There are plenty of other examples of WTO provisions which are designed to promote fair and undistorted competition.
Encouraging development and economic reform.
This trend effectively killed the notion that the trading system existed only for industrialized countries. It also changed the previous emphasis on exempting developing countries from certain GATT provisions and agreements. With the end of the Uruguay Round, developing countries showed themselves prepared to take on most of the obligations that are required of developed countries. They were, however, given transition periods to adjust to the more unfamiliar and, perhaps, difficult WTO provisions - particularly so for the poorest, "least-developed" countries. In addition, a Ministerial decision on measures in favour of least-developed countries gives extra flexibility to those countries in implementing WTO agreements; calls for an acceleration in the implementation of market access concessions affecting goods of export interest to those countries; and seeks increased technical assistance for them. Thus, the value to development of pursuing, as far as is reasonable, open market-oriented policies, based on WTO principles, is widely recognized. But so is the need for some flexibility with respect to the speed at which those policies are pursued.
Nevertheless, the provisions of the GATT intended to favour developing countries remain in place in the WTO. In particular, Part IV of GATT 1994 contains three articles, introduced in 1965, encouraging industrial countries to assist developing nation members "as a matter of conscious and purposeful effort" in their trading conditions and not to expect reciprocity for concessions made to developing countries in negotiations. A second measure, agreed at the end of the Tokyo Round in 1979 and normally referred to as the "enabling clause", provides a permanent legal basis for the market access concessions made by developed to developing countries under the generalized system of preferences (GSP).
The case for open trade.
The economic case for an open trading system based upon multilaterally agreed rules is simple enough and rests largely on commercial common sense.
All countries, including the poorest, have assets - human, industrial, natural, financial - which they can employ to produce goods and services for their domestic markets or to compete overseas. "Comparative advantage" means that countries prosper by taking advantage of their assets in order to concentrate on what they can produce best. This happens naturally for firms in the domestic market, but that is only half the story. The other half involves the world market. Most firms recognize that the bigger the market the greater their potential - in terms of achieving efficient scales of operation and having access to large numbers of customers. In other words, liberal trade policies which allow the unrestricted flow of goods, services and productive inputs multiply the rewards that come with producing the best products, with the best design, at the best price.
But trading success is not a static thing. Competitiveness in particular products can move from company to company when the market changes or new technologies make cheaper and better products possible. History and experience show that whole countries which have enjoyed an advantage, say, in the cost of labour or natural resources, can also become uncompetitive in some goods or services as their economies develop. However, with the stimulus of an open economy, they move on to become competitive elsewhere. This is, in general, a gradual process. For as much as the trading system is allowed to operate without the constraints of protectionism, firms are encouraged to adapt in an orderly and relatively painless way to focus on new products, finding either a new "niche" in their current area or expanding into new product areas.
The alternative of import protection and perpetual government subsidies leads to bloated, inefficient companies supplying consumers with outdated, unattractive products. Ultimately, factories close and jobs are lost despite protection and subsidies. If other governments pursue such policies overseas, markets contract and world economic activity is reduced. One of the objectives of the WTO is to prevent such a self-defeating and destructive drift into protectionism.
Comments
Post a Comment